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Social Networking and 
Workers’ Compensation Law at 
the Crossroads 
 
Jaclyn S. Millner* and Gregory M. Duhl** 
 
Abstract 
 
Over the past decade, social networking has increasingly 
influenced the practice of both civil and criminal law. One way 
to illustrate those influences is to examine a “system” of laws 
and the parties and lawyers in that system. In this Article, we 
examine how social networking has influenced workers‟ 
compensation law. In particular, this Article looks at the 
intersection of professional responsibility, discovery, privacy, 
and evidence with social networking in state workers‟ 
compensation systems. 
Workers‟ compensation laws are no-fault insurance 
systems designed to resolve disputes efficiently. Consequently, 
the rules of evidence are often more relaxed and the rules of 
discovery often more restricted than in state and federal court 
litigation. The flexible and self-contained structure of workers‟ 
compensation systems provides an ideal backdrop against 
which to examine how information from social networking sites 
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can be used as evidence to resolve civil disputes. 
A state‟s workers‟ compensation system should use the 
rules that have traditionally applied to non-electronic 
information as a starting point to address issues arising from 
lawyers gathering and introducing into evidence information 
stored on social networking sites. At the same time, because of 
the efficiency of workers‟ compensation law and the large 
discretion vested in its judges, workers‟ compensation systems 
have the potential to be laboratories for new technologies and 
how they can be used in the resolution of disputes, both inside 
and outside of workers‟ compensation. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Workers‟ compensation systems1 provide a backdrop 
against which to examine how lawyers and judges can use 
evidence from social networking sites to help resolve civil 
disputes. An employee2 alleging a workplace injury can 
communicate feelings, information, or photographs on a social 
networking site that contradict her claim. While the employee‟s 
attorney should counsel her client to exercise caution in 
making such communications, defense counsel3 faces the 
 
1. Each state has its own workers‟ compensation system governed by 
state statute and administrative rules. See Office of Disability Employment 
Policy, U.S. DEP‟T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/odep/pubs/fact/employ.htm 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2010) (“Workers‟ Compensation laws are administered 
at the state level. . . . Because each state has its own system, coverage 
varies.”). In this Article, we focus on the common elements of those systems. 
2. We use “employee” and “plaintiff” interchangeably in this Article to 
refer to the workers‟ compensation claimant. The claimant could be a former 
employee if employed at the time the alleged injury occurred. 
3. In workers‟ compensation litigation, the “defense” includes both the 
employer and insurer. The employer contracts with the insurer to provide 
workers‟ compensation coverage. We use “defense counsel” in this Article to 
refer to counsel for the employer and the insurer, whether the same or 
different. The insurer typically controls the litigation, as the insurer is the 
party paying workers‟ compensation benefits to the employee. See, e.g., 
Herring v. Jackson, 122 S.E.2d 366, 371-72 (N.C. 1961) (finding the insurer to 
be the “real party in interest” because the employer had nothing to gain or 
lose in the action and any recovered amount would inure to the insurance 
company); Russell v. W. Oil Co., 174 S.E. 101, 104 (N.C. 1934) (“The insurer 
is practically the real party to the controversy and controls the litigation.”). 
Most workers‟ compensation insurance policies also provide language 
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challenge of gathering and introducing such communications 
into evidence.4 
Despite this potential for social networking evidence, its 
use in workers‟ compensation cases and civil litigation more 
generally is uncommon. Consequently, there is a relative 
absence of cases, statutes, rules, and ethics opinions that 
prescribe attorney conduct in gathering and introducing such 
evidence. Because workers‟ compensation systems are intended 
to be discrete, efficient, and discretionary, they are ideal 
systems within which to explore how social networking and 
other new technologies can be used in the resolution of 
disputes. 
Workers‟ compensation laws are no-fault, providing 
compensation for job-related injuries5 and offering a more 
efficient mechanism for claim resolution than trial courts.6 
They protect employees by providing assured and prompt 
compensation for work-related injuries and consequential loss 
of income without the parties and attorneys expending the 
excessive time and resources typical of state and federal court 
litigation.7 
 
indicating that the insurer controls the litigation, and the employer must 
assist the insurer in litigation against the employee upon request. 
4. See Shannon Awsumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next E-Discovery 
Frontier, MINN. BENCH & B., Nov. 2009, at 23, available at 
http://www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2009/nov09/networking.html 
(“Experienced attorneys know that embracing new technologies—such as 
social networking sites—can make the difference between winning and losing 
cases.”). 
5. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 4 (“The Legislature is hereby 
expressly vested with plenary power, unlimited by any provision of this 
Constitution, to create, and enforce a complete system of workers‟ 
compensation, by appropriate legislation, and in that behalf to create and 
enforce a liability on the part of any or all persons to compensate any or all of 
their workers for injury or disability, and their dependents for death incurred 
or sustained by the said workers in the course of their employment, 
irrespective of the fault of any party.”); Curtis v. G.E. Capital Modular Space, 
155 S.W.3d 877, 884 (Tenn. 2005) (“To do so would confuse the fault-based 
liability of tort with the statutorily imposed „no fault‟ liability of workers‟ 
compensation.”). 
6. United Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 993 P.2d 1152, 
1161 (Colo. 2000) (“Traditionally, workers‟ compensation laws have provided 
an efficient system for remedying the effects of allocating the costs of 
industrial injuries.”). 
7. Ruggery v. N.C. Dep‟t of Corr., 520 S.E.2d 77, 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) 
3
4 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:1 
Similarly, social networking sites enable individuals to 
exchange information efficiently over the Internet.8 Social 
networking provides a structure for people to express their 
personalities and identities, and meet people with similar 
interests.9 Individuals can have online profiles,10 friends,11 
blogs, discussions, and groups.12 Users may also post pictures, 
videos, and other information to their social networking 
profiles.13 By facilitating connections with friends, relatives, 
and those with similar interests, social networking creates a 
sense of intimacy and community for users.14 
 
(“The policy underlying the Worker‟s Compensation Act is to „provide a swift 
and certain remedy to an injured worker and to ensure a limited and 
determinate liability for employers.‟” (quoting Matthews v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Hosp., 510 S.E.2d 388, 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999))); Lascio v. 
Belcher Roofing Corp., 704 A.2d 642, 644-45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (“[The] 
purpose of [the workers‟ compensation system] is to protect employees by 
providing quick and certain compensation for work-related injuries and 
resultant loss of injuries without wasting time and expenses on litigation.”). 
8. See Kristi L. Gustafson, Social Networks Alter Class Reunion 
Dynamics, ALBANY TIMES UNION (Apr. 29, 2010), 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/life/main/6980262.html (“Social 
networking is an efficient, cost-effective way to share information.”). 
9. See Daniel Nations, What Is Social Networking?, ABOUT.COM, 
http://webtrends.about.com/od/socialnetworking/a/social-network.htm (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2010). 
10. Profiles include basic information, including a person‟s age, location, 
and interests. See id. 
11. “Friends are trusted members of [an individual‟s profile] [who] are 
allowed to post comments on [the] profile or send [the individual] private 
messages.” Id. When a person sends an invitation to someone to become a 
“friend” on Facebook or another social networking site, if the individual 
accepts, the inviter and invitee have access to each other‟s information and 
can communicate with one another. See Definition of Friending, PCMAG.COM, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=friending&i=61604,00.as
p (last visited Aug. 20, 2010). After “friending” another social networking 
user on the same site, friends can be subsequently “defriended” or 
“unfriended,” which terminates the “friendship” and users‟ access to each 
other‟s information. Id. Not all social networking sites use the term “friends”; 
LinkdIn, for example, uses the term “connections.” See Nations, supra note 9. 
However, all sites permit a user to designate another member as trusted and 
give that person access to the user‟s information. Id. 
12. See Nations, supra note 9. Groups enable social networking users on 
a site to find people with similar interests or backgrounds. Id. A group can 
have any sort of focus, from “Diet Coke Lovers” to “Valley High School Class 
of 1999” to a particular book, television show, or movie. Id. 
13. See id. 
14. See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 23 (“Social networking sites are now 
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Nearly half of all adult Americans have a social 
networking profile,15 with Facebook and MySpace being the 
most popular sites.16 As social networking continues to play an 
increasingly prevalent role in society, lawyers and judges 
involved in workers‟ compensation will have to confront 
discovery, professional responsibility, privacy, and evidentiary 
issues that arise in connection with social networking 
evidence.17 
Part II of this Article discusses legal issues related to 
gathering information stored on a social networking site from 
both the employee and social networking site operator. Part III 
goes on to address professional responsibility issues that arise 
for plaintiffs‟ and defense attorneys in connection with an 
employee maintaining, and defense counsel gathering, 
information stored on a social networking site. Part IV 
discusses issues relating to admitting social networking 
evidence at the time of a workers‟ compensation hearing or 
trial, after it has been obtained by defense counsel. We 
conclude in Part V that workers‟ compensation systems should 
use the existing rules governing the discovery and admissibility 
 
widely recognized to be a key source of information regarding a person 
because „[a]lthough these sites provide users with a sense of intimacy and 
community, they also create a potentially permanent record of personal 
information that becomes a virtual information bonanza about a litigant‟s 
private life and state of mind.‟” (quoting Ronald J. Levine & Susan L. 
Swatski-Lebson, Are Social Networking Sites Discoverable?, LAW.COM (Nov. 
13, 2008), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=120242597
4937)). 
15. See TOM WEBSTER, THE SOCIAL HABIT—FREQUENT SOCIAL 
NETWORKERS: THE EDISON/ARBITRON INTERNET AND MULTIMEDIA STUDY 2010 
(2010), 
http://www.edisonresearch.com/The_Social_Habit_Edison_Social_Media_Stud
y_2010.pdf 
(stating that a survey from February 2010 found 48% of Americans have a 
profile on Facebook, MySpace, or another social networking site); Adults on 
Social Network Sites, 2005-2009, PEW INTERNET (Oct. 8, 2009), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Infographics/Growth-in-Adult-SNS-Use-
20052009.aspx (stating that 46% of American adults use some type of social 
networking site). 
16. See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 23. 
17. See id. (“Experienced attorneys know that embracing new 
technologies—such as social networking sites—can make the difference 
between winning and losing cases.”). 
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of electronic and non-electronic information as a starting point 
in addressing issues that arise at the crossroads of social 
networking and workers‟ compensation law. As efficient 
systems, providing considerable discretion to the judge, 
workers‟ compensation laws offer lawyers and judges the 
ability to address and explore the role of social networking 
evidence in dispute resolution. 
 
II.  Discovering Employee Information Stored on Social 
Networking Sites 
 
This Part explores the legal issues that can arise when 
defense counsel seeks an employee‟s communications and other 
information stored on a social networking site. We address two 
topics: (A) the extent to which an employee‟s information stored 
on a social networking site is discoverable from the employee in 
a workers‟ compensation case; and (B) the extent to which an 
employee‟s information stored on a social networking site is 
discoverable from the third-party site operator in a workers‟ 
compensation case. The employee‟s privacy and the Stored 
Communications Act,18 part of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act,19 potentially limit discovery from the site operator. 
 
A.  Discovery of Social Networking Information from the 
Employee 
 
This Part focuses on the rules regulating discovery20 in 
 
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006). 
19. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
20. This Part uses the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to discuss 
discovery in state workers‟ compensation courts. To date, the majority of 
states have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with minimal 
changes. See Rules of Civil Procedure, USLEGAL.COM, 
http://civilprocedure.uslegal.com/rules-of-civil-procedure/ (last visited Aug. 
20, 2010) (“[T]hirty-five states have adopted the federal rules as their own 
procedural code.”). In most states, though workers‟ compensation courts are 
governed by administrative rules, they have adopted the state‟s rules of civil 
procedure with regard to discovery. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 60Q-
6.114 (2006) (applying the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to workers‟ 
compensation proceedings); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-102(d)(1) (West 2008 & 
Supp. 2009) (“Discovery procedures shall be governed and controlled by 
Chapter 11 of Title 9, the „Georgia Civil Practice Act.‟”); IDAHO JUDICIAL R. 
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PRAC. & P. 7(C) (2008) (“Procedural matters relating to discovery, except 
sanctions, shall be controlled by the appropriate provisions of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-1-3(a) (West 2009) (“The worker‟s 
compensation board may adopt rules under IC 4-22-2 to carry into effect the 
worker‟s compensation law (IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6) and the worker‟s 
occupational diseases law (IC 22-3-7).”); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 876-4.35(86) 
(2009) (“The rules of civil procedure shall govern the contested case 
proceedings before the workers‟ compensation commissioner . . . .”); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, ch. 4, app. r. 30 (West 2005) (“[P]roduction of documentary 
evidence shall be obtained in accordance with Title 12 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes [Oklahoma state rules of civil procedure].”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
656.285 (West 2003) (“ORCP [Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure] 36 C shall 
apply to workers‟ compensation cases, except that the Administrative Law 
Judge shall make the determinations and orders required of the court in 
ORCP 36 C, and in addition attorney fees shall not be declared as a matter of 
course but only in cases of harassment or hardship.”); Camelback 
Contractors, Inc. v. Indus. Comm‟n, 608 P.2d 782, 785 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) 
(holding that discovery before the industrial commission in Arizona “should 
not be more restrictive than that employed in superior court”); Mid-Delta 
Home Health, Inc. v. Robertson, 749 So. 2d 379, 388 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) 
(“[The Workers‟ Compensation] Commission will not disregard the time-
honored guidelines of discovery . . . .”). 
 States such as Minnesota, which follow more restrictive rules for 
discovery in workers‟ compensation cases to speed up the claim-resolution 
process, do permit the compensation judge to order discovery under the 
state‟s rules of civil procedure. See MINN. R. 1420.2200, subpt. 3 (2006) (“The 
judge may order discovery available under the Rules of Civil Procedure for 
the district courts of Minnesota provided that the discovery: . . . is needed for 
the proper presentation of a party‟s case . . . .”); Edeogu v. Bauerly Bros., Inc., 
No. WC05-202, 2005 MN Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 247, at *5 (Minn. Work. Comp. 
Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2005) (stating that the workers‟ compensation court may 
rely on the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 Moreover, some states with more restrictive discovery rules specifically 
permit surveillance as a form of discovery, see, e.g., MINN. R. 1420.2200, 
subpt. 8(A) (2006), and informal discovery of social networking evidence is a 
form of surveillance. Id. (“Surveillance evidence under this part includes any 
photographic, video, digital, motion picture, or other electronic recording or 
depiction of a party surreptitiously taken or obtained without the party‟s 
expressed permission or knowledge.”); see also Anders Albrechtslund, Online 
Social Networking as Participatory Surveillance, FIRST MONDAY (Mar. 2008), 
http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2142/1949 
(“First, online social networking is related to the traditional hierarchical 
surveillance concept. . . . The word surveillance is etymologically associated 
with the French word surveiller, which translates simply as to watch over. 
The verb suggests the visual practice of a person looking carefully at someone 
or something from above. Both in ordinary language and within academic 
debate, the practice of „watching over‟ has become a metaphor for all other 
monitoring activities. Thus, the understanding of surveillance is not limited 
to a visual practice; rather it involves all senses—data collection and 
technological mediation.”). Consequently, in states with restricted workers‟ 
compensation discovery rules, defense counsel can discover social networking 
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workers‟ compensation cases and the few state and federal 
cases that suggest defense counsel can acquire relevant 
information stored on a social networking site from an 
employee. 
 
1.   Background of E-Discovery and the Scope of Discovery 
 
The discovery process makes relevant information 
available to litigants.21 Electronic discovery allows parties to 
obtain “electronically stored information” (ESI),22 a term 
adopted by the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 2006.23 ESI includes digital information that can 
 
evidence, either by following the rules for conducting surveillance or the 
state‟s rules of civil procedure. 
21. See Aaron Blank, On the Precipe of E-Discovery: Can Litigants 
Obtain Employee Social Networking Web Site Information Through 
Employers?, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 487, 495 (2010) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 
26 advisory committee‟s note (1983)). “Discovery” describes evidence obtained 
during the pre-trial stage of a lawsuit. See Ken LaMance, Electronic 
Discovery—Can Contents of My Electronic Communications Be Used as 
Evidence in Court?, EZINE ARTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?Electronic-
Discovery---Can-Contents-of-My-Electronic-Communications-Be-Used-As-
Evidence-in-Court?&id=3962081 (last visited Aug. 20, 2010). 
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), 33(d), 34(a)(1)(A); see also LaMance, 
supra note 21 (“Electronically Stored Information, or „ESI,‟ is an actual legal 
term adopted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2006. ESI refers to 
information that is created, stored, and used in digital form, and requires the 
use of a computer for access.”). 
23. Blank, supra note 21, at 495-96; LaMance, supra note 21; see FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26. The advisory committee found the amendments to be necessary for 
two primary reasons: 
 
First, electronically stored information has important 
differences from information recorded on paper. The most 
salient of these differences are that electronically stored 
information is retained in exponentially greater volume 
than hard-copy documents; electronically stored information 
is dynamic, rather than static; and electronically stored 
information may be incomprehensible when separated from 
the system that created it. Second, these differences are 
causing problems in discovery that rule amendments can 
helpfully address. 
 
REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (July 25, 2005), SL061 ALI-
ABA 1101, 1103 (Westlaw). 
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be accessed only by computer.24 The rules regulating discovery 
more generally also govern ESI.25 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) outlines the scope 
of discovery, including the discovery of ESI. The scope of 
discovery is broad, and non-privileged information that is 
“relevant to any party‟s claim or defense” is discoverable.26 
States that follow more limited rules of discovery for workers‟ 
compensation claims also use a relevancy standard with 
respect to discovery of surveillance evidence,27 which includes 
information stored on a social networking site. The standard 
for determining “relevance” is “whether there is any possibility 
that the information sought may be relevant to the subject 
matter of the action.”28 
As social networking continues to become more 
widespread, information relevant to employees‟ workers‟ 
compensation claims could be available on Facebook and other 
social networking sites.29 Such sites serve as a significant 
 
24. LaMance, supra note 21. Examples of ESI include e-mails, websites, 
and digitally stored documents and pictures. Id. 
25. See id. 
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
27. See, e.g., MINN. R. 1420.2200, subpt. 8(A) (2006) (indicating that 
relevant surveillance evidence is discoverable).  
28. AM Int‟l, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 100 F.R.D. 255, 257 (N.D. Ill. 
1981) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also TBG Ins. 
Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 160 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(“[The defendant] is entitled to discover any non-privileged information, 
cumulative or not, that may reasonably assist it in developing its defense, 
preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement.”); Blank, supra note 21, at 496 
(“[The test for relevance is] whether there is any possibility that the 
information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action.” 
(quoting AM Int’l, 100 F.R.D. at 257) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
29. See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 25 (“Attorneys can discover the user‟s 
postings, list of friends, shared photos and videos, and other valuable 
information. If a person has heightened security settings, attorneys may still 
be able to discover the social networking account, but will not be able to 
access the person‟s profile information unless the user provides permission 
through granting a „friend‟ request. Even if attorneys can only gather limited 
information informally, that information can provide a means to tailor 
subsequent formal discovery.”); Leora Maccabee, Facebook 101: Why Lawyers 
Should Be on Facebook, LAWYERIST.COM (Apr. 23, 2009), 
http://lawyerist.com/facebook-101-why-lawyers-should-be-on-facebook/ 
(“Facebook can be an effective tool for investigating defendants, witnesses, 
and prosecutors. Evidence revealed from profile searches has been used . . . to 
show the extent of plaintiffs‟ injuries after an accident.”). Take one example 
9
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information source because, “[a]lthough [they] provide users 
with a sense of intimacy and community, they also create a 
potentially permanent record of personal information that 
becomes a virtual information bonanza about a litigant‟s 
private life and state of mind.”30 An employee alleging a 
workplace injury could post photographs, communications, or 
other information that either contradict a workplace injury 
claim, or alert defense investigators of times and places to 
engage in surveillance.31 
 
2.  Informal Discovery 
 
Social networking information can be discovered both 
formally and informally. Attorneys can informally discover 
information by searching on Google, Yahoo!, or any other 
search engine for the employee and seeing if a link to an 
employee‟s social networking account comes up in the results.32 
In addition, attorneys can search individual social networking 
 
from a products liability case. A federal district court dismissed a welder‟s 
claim when defense lawyers discovered pictures of him on Facebook racing 
motorboats despite his disability claims. See Liz McKenzie, Poking Around 
Facebook Could Win Your Case, LAW360 (Feb. 4, 2010), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/147130. 
30. Awsumb, supra note 4, at 23 (quoting Levine & Swatski-Lebson, 
supra note 14). 
31. Roberto Ceniceros, Comp Cheats Confess All on Social Networking 
Sites, WORKFORCE MGMT. ONLINE (Sept. 2009), 
http://www.workforce.com/section/02/feature/26/66/08/ (“Then there is the 
listing of physical activities . . . . [I]nvestigators found the claimant‟s 
Facebook site and learned about his participation in bowling tournaments 
and a bowling alley he frequented. . . . An investigator visiting the bowling 
alley found a large banner congratulating the claimant for rolling a perfect 
game and the date he rolled the game.”); Michael O‟Connor & Assocs., LLC, 
Workers’ Compensation Investigators Use Social Networking Sites to Nab 
Fraudulent Claimants, PA. WORKERS‟ COMPENSATION LAW. BLOG (Sept. 30, 
2009, 9:19 AM), 
http://www.pennsylvaniaworkerscompensationlawyersblog.com/2009/09/work
ers-compensation-investiga.html (“By searching for a claimant‟s profile on 
sites like Facebook or MySpace, investigators can uncover a myriad of self-
incriminating information, such as dates of sporting events in which the 
claimant is participating. Social networking sites can also contain time-
stamped photos and videos showing claimants involved in physical activities 
that could be outside the level of disability that the injured worker is 
claiming.”). 
32. See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 23. 
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sites, such as Facebook and MySpace, by the name of the 
employee.33 
Whether an individual‟s social networking profile and 
information can be publicly viewed depends on the particular 
social networking website and the individual‟s specific security 
settings. By using the site‟s control settings, users of Facebook, 
MySpace, and other social networking sites are able to control 
whether the information provided on their profile is public or 
private.34 A user may place his or her security settings on a 
spectrum ranging from a completely public profile, which may 
be viewed by anyone, to a private profile, which is accessible 
only to individuals the user accepts as “friends” or 
“connections.”35 Just as a workers‟ compensation attorney may 
use informal discovery to observe an employee in a public 
place, such as a park or a restaurant,36 so too is a workers‟ 
compensation attorney able to use informal discovery to 
observe and search information publicly available online. When 
conducting informal discovery, however, attorneys should be 
cognizant of professional responsibility obligations.37 
 
33. See id. 
34. See id. (“Most social networking sites, including Facebook and 
MySpace, enable individual users to control whether their information is 
private or public and to whom it can be disseminated.”). 
35. See id. (“The security settings range from uncensored, public profiles 
that can be accessed and located through the social networking site or any 
Internet search engine, to private profiles, accessible only to persons 
designated as friends.”). If a particular user‟s Facebook account, for example, 
has low security settings, the general public can access the individual‟s 
profile by searching the Internet or by searching for the person‟s name on the 
Facebook website. Attorneys and others can discover the individual‟s list of 
friends, shared postings, photographs, and videos. See id. at 24. If an 
individual sets high security settings, attorneys may still be able to discover 
that the individual has a Facebook account but will not be able to view the 
individual‟s profile or information unless the individual allows the attorney to 
do so by extending or accepting a “friend” request. See id. Individuals with 
very high security settings can even prevent the public from uncovering that 
they have a Facebook account through searches on the Internet or the 
Facebook website. 
36. See Baumann v. Joyner Silver & Electroplating, 47 W.C.D. 611, 1992 
MN Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 622, at *15 n.3 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 
1992) (finding that, as a general rule, contact made to acquire information 
that an employee would normally provide to the public in the course of public 
activities is not proscribed conduct). 
37. See infra Part III. 
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3.   Formal Discovery 
 
Social networking information that is not publicly 
available can be obtained through the formal discovery process. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a)(1)(A) allows a party to 
request “any designated documents or electronically stored 
information—including . . . data or data compilations—stored 
in any medium” in “the responding party‟s possession, custody, 
or control.”38 Accordingly, defense counsel may request any 
information posted and stored on social networking websites, 
including discussion and message postings, pictures, and 
videos relevant to the employee‟s claim. 
Employees in workers‟ compensation cases should disclose 
such relevant information in response to narrowly tailored 
discovery requests.39 If a plaintiff‟s attorney objects to the 
production of this information, the defense attorney must 
demonstrate its relevance.40 If a document request for social 
networking information is at least facially relevant and the 
plaintiff is able, but does not wish, to produce the relevant 
 
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1), (a)(1)(A). Rule 34 was “intended to be broad 
enough to cover all current types of computer-based information, and flexible 
enough to encompass future changes and developments.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34 
advisory committee‟s note. Rules 33 and 26(a)(1) also address formal 
discovery of electronically stored information. See Michael A. Oakes, Meghan 
A. Podolny & John W. Woods Jr., Social Networking Sites and the E-
Discovery Process, DATA PROTECTION L. & POL‟Y (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details%5CFileUpload265%5C2856%5C
E-Discovery_DPLP_Feb10.pdf (“Firstly, the amendments introduced the 
phrase „electronically stored information‟ to Rules 26(a)(1), 33, and 34 to 
acknowledge that ESI is discoverable.”). 
39. See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 24 (“Courts are willing to require users 
to produce social networking information in response to narrowly tailored 
discovery requests.”); see also Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-CV-
01958-WYDMJW, 2009 WL 1067018, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009) (“[T]he 
information sought within the four corners of the subpoenas issued to 
Facebook, MySpace, Inc., and Meetup.com is reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence [and] is relevant to the issues in this 
case.”); Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat‟l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 
2:06CV00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *8 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) 
(finding that the employer could discover MySpace messages relating to 
issues relevant to the case). 
40. See Oakes, Podolny & Woods, supra note 38 (“Although ESI is 
potentially discoverable—in any form—in US litigation, if a party objects to 
the production of social networking data, the litigant seeking the information 
will still be required to demonstrate its relevance.”). 
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document, the plaintiff‟s attorney has the burden of 
establishing that the document is not relevant in order to avoid 
producing it.41 
In EEOC v. Simply Storage Management, LLC, an 
employment law case, a magistrate judge ordered employees to 
produce social networking profile information from their 
Facebook and MySpace accounts in response to a discovery 
request.42 The EEOC filed a sexual harassment complaint on 
behalf of two employees against their supervisor.43 It requested 
a discovery conference because counsel disagreed about the 
proper scope of discovery involving social networking 
documents, including items from Facebook and MySpace.44 The 
 
41. See Scott v. Leavenworth Unified Sch. Dist. No. 453, 190 F.R.D. 583, 
585 (D. Kan. 1999) (“When the discovery sought appears relevant, the party 
resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance . . . 
.”); Blank, supra note 21, at 496 (“If a request for information is facially 
relevant and the party does not wish to produce it, the producing party must 
establish the document is not relevant.”). 
42. EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1223-WTL-DML 
(S.D. Ind. May 11, 2010) (order on discovery issues raised during April 21 
conference), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/full/31921843?access_key=key-2i8jdft9a1tammq659sv 
[hereinafter Order on Discovery]. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 2. The disputed documents requested through the formal 
discovery process included: 
 
Request No. 1: All photographs or videos posted by 
Joanie Zupan or anyone on her behalf on Facebook or 
MySpace from April 23, 2007 to the present. 
Request No. 2: Electronic copies of Joanie Zupan‟s 
complete profile on Facebook and MySpace (including all 
updates, changes or modifications to Zupan‟s profile) and all 
status updates, messages, wall comments, causes joined, 
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries, details, blurbs, 
comments, and applications (including, but not limited to, 
“How well do you know me” and the “Naughty Application”) 
for the period from April 23, 2007 to the present. To the 
extent electronic copies are not available, please provide the 
documents in hard copy form. 
Request No. 3: All photographs or videos posted by 
Tara Strahl or anyone on her behalf on Facebook or 
MySpace from October 11, 2007 to November 26, 2008. 
Request No. 4: Electronic copies of Tara Strahl‟s 
complete profile on Facebook and MySpace (including all 
updates, changes, or modifications to Strahl‟s profile) and 
13
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EEOC objected to the demand for the production of all 
documents related to the plaintiffs‟ social networking accounts 
and to deposition testimony about the employees‟ social 
networking profiles on the grounds that the requests were 
overbroad, not relevant, unduly burdensome, harassing, and 
embarrassing toward the employees.45 Magistrate Judge Debra 
Lynch found that the standard for discovery‟s scope is broad46 
and noted that, where relevance is in doubt, the court should 
be permissive.47 
However, she also emphasized that the scope of discovery 
is not limitless.48 The EEOC argued that discovery of Facebook 
 
all status updates, messages, wall comments, causes joined, 
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries, details, blurbs, 
comments, and applications (including, but not limited to, 
“How well do you know me” and the “Naughty Application”) 
for the period from October 11, 2007 to November 26, 2008. 
To the extent electronic copies are not available, please 
provide these documents in hard copy form. 
 
Id. 
45. Id. at 3. 
46. Id. at 4; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b) reads: 
 
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of 
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 
party‟s claim or defense—including the existence, 
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
documents or other tangible things and the identity and 
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. 
For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. 
Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if 
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to 
the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C). 
 
47. Order on Discovery, supra note 42, at 4; see also Truswal Sys. Corp. 
v. Hydro-Air Eng‟g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1211-12 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing 
the scope of Rule 26(b)(1)). 
48. See Order on Discovery, supra note 42, at 4 (citing Rozell v. Ross-
Holst, No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK)(JCF), 2006 WL 163143, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 
2006)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) provides that: 
 
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency 
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and MySpace profiles should be limited to information that 
directly relates to issues raised in the complaint.49 Ultimately, 
Magistrate Judge Lynch found all social networking content 
revealing, relating, or simply referring to allegations raised in 
the complaint to be discoverable.50 Judge Lynch also found that 
the fact that a user‟s profile is private and not available to the 
public does not shield information in that user‟s profile from 
discovery.51 
Similarly, in Bass v. Miss Porter’s School, a case involving 
harassment of a high school student at an elite boarding school, 
the plaintiff objected to a discovery request for information 
from his Facebook profile.52 Again, the court found a low 
threshold for the discovery of social networking information. 
The court held: 
 
Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of the user‟s 
relationships and state of mind at the time of the 
content‟s posting. Therefore, relevance of the 
content of [p]laintiff‟s Facebook usage as to both 
liability and damages in this case is more in the 
eye of the beholder than subject to strict legal 
demarcations, and production should not be 
limited to [p]laintiff‟s own determination of what 
 
or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by 
local rule if it determines that: 
 
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that 
is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; 
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity 
to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or 
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the 
case, the amount in controversy, the parties‟ resources, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. 
 
49. Order on Discovery, supra note 42, at 5. 
50. Id. at 9-10. This content included third-party communications, 
videos, and photographs posted on Facebook and MySpace. Id. 
51. Id. at 6. 
52. No. 3:08CV1807(JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 
2009). 
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may be “reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”53 
 
Thus, the court in Bass upheld the broad relevancy 
standard for discovery of social networking information, and 
the result should be no different in the workers‟ compensation 
context. Defense counsel should be able to discover information 
that is relevant to allegations raised in the employee‟s initial 
pleading,54 including information relating to the employee‟s 
alleged work injuries or employment abilities. 
Moreover, a federal magistrate judge in New Jersey found 
writings shared on social networking sites to be discoverable.55 
 
53. Id. (citations omitted); see also Oakes, Podolny & Woods, supra note 
38 (“The court disagreed, holding that „Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of 
the user‟s relationships and state of mind at the time of the content‟s posting‟ 
and that the content‟s relevance to both liability and damages would be „more 
in the eye of the beholder than subject to strict legal demarcations‟ of what 
one party determines might be „reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence.‟”). 
54. The plaintiff‟s initial pleading in non-workers‟ compensation state 
court matters is typically known as the “complaint,” pursuant to the state‟s 
rules of civil procedure. Workers‟ compensation courts and rules, however, 
refer to the employee‟s first pleading by different terms, including “Claim 
Petition” and “Employee Claim.” See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.291 (2008); 
MINN. R. 1415.1000, subpt. 1 (2006); How to File a Claim, N.Y. ST. WORKERS‟ 
COMPENSATION BD., 
http://www.wcb.state.ny.us/content/main/onthejob/howto.jsp (last visited Aug. 
20, 2010). 
55. Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., No. 2:06-cv-5377-
FSH-PS, slip op. at 5-6 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2007) (order denying motion for 
reconsideration), available at 
http://www.onpointnews.com/docs/anorexia2b.pdf [hereinafter Order Denying 
Motion for Reconsideration]. This order modified an October 31, 2007, order 
as follows: 
 
(1) [N]o later than January 15, 2008, plaintiffs shall 
produce writings shared with others including entries on 
websites such as “Facebook” or “MySpace”; (2) plaintiffs 
shall preserve journals, diaries and writings not shared 
with others and if defendants‟ experts believe they are 
needed to render an opinion then they can make an 
application seeking their production; and (3) writings 
shared with health care professionals shall be produced as 
part of the medical records. 
 
Id. at 5-6. 
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In Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey,56 an 
insurer sought production of all e-mails, journals, diaries, and 
communications involving minor children‟s eating disorders or 
manifestations and symptoms of the eating disorders.57 
Magistrate Judge Patty Shwartz ordered the minors to produce 
all entries on web pages, such as Facebook and MySpace, 
which the minors had shared with others.58 Again, Beye 
indicates that there is precedent for workers‟ compensation 
courts to permit discovery of all entries on social networking 
sites that relate to an employee‟s physical abilities. 
 
4. Defenses to Formal Discovery 
 
Even if a party establishes that discovery of an employee‟s 
social networking profile information is relevant, a court may 
exclude it from discovery “if it is privileged,” if its production 
would impose an undue burden on the employee, or if the 
employee “has superseding privacy interests in the account.”59 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5) states that 
discoverable information may be withheld if it is privileged.60 
Privileged information may include information subject to the 
attorney-client privilege, commercial trade secrets, private 
settlement agreements, and employment confidentiality 
agreements.61 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(b) 
“provides that a party does not have to produce ESI that is „not 
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.‟”62 
 
 
56. CIV. 06-5337, 2008 WL 3064757 (D.N.J. July 29, 2008). 
57. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 55, at 5-6. 
58. Id. 
59. Blank, supra note 21, at 506; see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing 
employee‟s defense of privacy). 
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). 
61. See Blank, supra note 21, at 506. Such forms of privileged 
information are generally not applicable to workers‟ compensation litigation, 
where information is obtained from either the employee or social networking 
provider directly, and the employer previously signed an insurance policy 
agreeing to provide information to the insurer to assist in the defense of any 
workers‟ compensation claim. 
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). In practice, courts use a balancing test to 
weigh the benefit and relevance of the information versus the burden and 
cost of producing it. See Blank, supra note 21, at 506. 
17
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5.   Suggestions for Workers‟ Compensation Attorneys  
   Relating to Formal Discovery 
 
In order to generate disclosure of social networking 
information from the employee through the formal discovery 
process, workers‟ compensation defense attorneys should ask in 
their interrogatories (or other form of discovery demand 
pursuant to their state‟s rules governing discovery) for the 
names of any social networking sites used by the employee and 
request copies of all relevant photographs, videos, postings, 
communications, and discussions from social networking sites 
relating to the employee‟s physical or employment abilities.63 
Defense attorneys should include similar questions during the 
employee‟s deposition.64 In order to comply with the rules 
governing discovery, plaintiffs‟ attorneys should encourage 
employees to disclose relevant social networking photographs, 
videos, postings, and other communications in response to a 
valid discovery request from defense counsel. 
 
B.  Discovery from Site Operators 
  
In addition to obtaining social networking profile 
information from the employee directly through the formal 
discovery process, attorneys can recover the employee‟s profile 
information from the social networking site operator under 
some circumstances.65 In situations where an employee refuses 
to disclose social networking profile information, or where the 
defense attorney believes or knows the employee has deleted 
all or part of his or her account, or has failed to disclose all 
information, defense counsel should consider using a narrowly 
tailored subpoena to the social networking site operator, as the 
 
63. See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 24 (“Include interrogatories seeking 
the identification of social networking sites used by a person and all user 
profiles and accounts. Include document requests seeking production of 
relevant information maintained or shared by a person on social networking 
sites, including video and photos.”). 
64. See id. (“Inquire regarding social networking usage during deposition 
questioning.”). 
65. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). Rule 37(a) permits a party to make a motion 
for an order to compel discovery from either a party or nonparty. 
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records custodian, to provide copies of relevant photographs, 
videos, and postings.66 Defense attorneys may also request that 
information on a social networking site be preserved by 
sending a preservation order to the site operator.67 
In circumstances where an employee deactivated or 
deleted her Facebook or other social networking account, the 
site operator may continue to have a record of the user‟s 
account information.68 If that information exists, social 
 
66. See Blank, supra note 21, at 504 (“Social networking Web sites are 
subject to subpoena just like any other business or person. As the custodian 
of records, subpoenaing the social networking site itself may be the best way 
to gain the information sought from the employee.”). The subpoena should be 
very specific, including the user‟s full name, birthday, e-mail addresses, and 
time period of the requested activity. 
67. See Lori Paul, Paralegal Practice Tip: How to Subpoena MySpace 
and Facebook Information, PARALEGAL BLAW BLAW BLAW (Oct. 10, 2009), 
http://lorijpaul.com/?tag=litigation. Although sending a preservation order 
allows the site operator to identify a user‟s account in order to preserve 
information, a site operator cannot provide this information to a defense 
attorney without a valid subpoena or permission of the user. See id. The 
preservation order, however, can ensure a site operator retains access to an 
employee‟s social networking profile information even after the employee 
deletes or loses access to his or her account. See id. 
68. See, e.g., Privacy Policy: Deactivating or Deleting Your Account, 
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Aug. 21, 2010) 
(“If you want to stop using your account you may deactivate it or delete it. 
When you deactivate an account, no user will be able to see it, but it will not 
be deleted. We save your profile information (connections, photos, etc.) in case 
you later decide to reactivate your account. Many users deactivate their 
accounts for temporary reasons and in doing so are asking us to maintain 
their information until they return to Facebook. You will still have the ability 
to reactivate your account and restore your profile in its entirety.”). Facebook 
also provides an option for users to delete an account permanently. Even 
after a user requests to delete his or her account, Facebook retains the 
account information for an undisclosed period of time, and may save 
information indefinitely. See Privacy: Deactivating, Deleting, and 
Memorializing Accounts, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=842 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2010) (“Our system delays the deletion process in case 
you change your mind and no longer want to permanently delete your 
account.”); see also Maria Aspan, After Stumbling, Facebook Finds a Working 
Eraser, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, at C5, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/business/18facebook.html?_r=1 (stating 
that deleting a Facebook account can be a very difficult and drawn-out 
process, and “[a]fter deletion, there may still be a record in Facebook‟s 
archives”); Don’t Forget Social Media in E-Discovery, WISC. L.J. (Mar. 31, 
2010), http://www.wislawjournal.com/blog/2010/04/05/Don8217t-forget-social-
media-in-ediscovery/ (discussing destruction of electronic evidence and 
stating that “Facebook and Twitter retain user pages”); Facebook’s Privacy 
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networking websites‟ privacy policies, including those of 
Facebook and MySpace, specifically allow the social networking 
provider to disclose user information in response to subpoenas, 
court orders or a consent executed by the employee.69 
Courts have upheld subpoenas to social networking site 
operators “when the discovery sought is relevant to the 
lawsuit.”70 Obtaining social networking information from the 
site operator, however, would likely be a very lengthy and 
costly process, contrary to workers‟ compensation‟s underlying 
goal of efficiency.71 Therefore, obtaining such information from 
the site operator would rarely be worth the cost and time to 
defense counsel. This option, however, serves as a check on the 
employee‟s ability to destroy or hide social networking 
information in a workers‟ compensation case and provides for 
more honest disclosure by employees. 
Two potential defenses that employees72 and social 
 
Policy: Limitations on Removal, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Aug. 21, 2010) 
(“Additionally, we may retain certain information to prevent identity theft 
and other misconduct even if deletion has been requested.”). 
69. Awsumb, supra note 4, at 24 (“The privacy policies of many service 
providers, including Facebook and MySpace, permit the disclosure of user 
information in response to subpoenas or court orders.”); see also Romano v. 
Steelcase Inc., No. 2006-2233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 7, 2009) (order) (directing 
the plaintiff to execute a consent to give the defendant access to the plaintiff‟s 
deleted MySpace and Facebook pages and accounts). 
70. See Blank, supra note 21, at 504-05. In Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., an employment law case, the magistrate judge upheld a subpoena to 
Facebook and MySpace requiring them to produce user information because 
the information sought was “reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of 
admissible evidence.” No. 06-cv-01958-WYD-MJW, 2009 WL1067018, at *2 
(D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009). 
71. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
72. While generally a party in litigation does not have standing to object 
to a subpoena served on a non-party to the action, it appears that an 
employee has standing to object to a subpoena duces tecum that defense 
counsel serves on a third-party site operator to the extent that defense 
counsel seeks personal information or communications of the employee 
protected by the Stored Communications Act. See, e.g., J.T. Shannon Lumber 
Co. v. Gilco Lumber Co., No. 2:07CV119, 2008 WL 3833216, at *1 (N.D. Aug. 
14, 2008) (holding that employee has standing to seek to quash subpoena 
served on Internet service provider for production of employee‟s personal 
information protected by the Stored Communications Act), quoted in Crispin 
v. Christian Audigier, Inc., No. CV-09-09509 MMM (JEMx), 2010 WL 
2293238, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2010). 
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networking site operators alike have to the production of 
employee information and communications by site operators 
are that (i) the employee information and communications are 
protected by the Stored Communications Act; and (ii) an 
employee has a privacy interest in her social networking 
information and communications that precludes disclosure by 
the site operator.73 We analyze each of these defenses in turn. 
 
1.  Stored Communications Act 
 
Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act (SCA)74 
in 1986, as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act,75 to address voluntary and compelled disclosure of “stored 
wire and electronic communications and transactional records” 
by Internet service providers. Congress defined first what was 
not allowed, with exceptions for what was, rather than defining 
what was permissible, with exceptions for what was not.76 
Congress also repeatedly distinguished between an “electronic 
communication service” (ECS) provider and a “remote 
computing service” (RCS) provider, delineating disclosure 
prohibitions for each type of service.77 This distinction has 
given courts headaches as they attempt to decide which 
category describes various electronic communications, with 
 
73. The employee could raise this second defense in response to a 
discovery request she receives from defense counsel to produce information 
and communications stored on a social networking site. See supra Part II.A.3. 
But because, at least in the published case law, an employee has used that 
defense only when discovery has been sought from the site operator, we 
analyze it here. 
74. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006). 
75. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
76. For example, subsection (a) of section 2702 states first, “Prohibitions. 
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c)—a person or entity providing an 
electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge . . 
. .” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). Subsection (b) is titled “Exceptions for disclosure of 
communications.” Id. § 2702(b). 
77. “[The term] „electronic communication service‟ means any service 
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or 
electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). “[T]he term „remote 
computing service‟ means the provision to the public of computer storage or 
processing services by means of an electronic communications system.” 18 
U.S.C. § 2711(2). 
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varying results.78 Social networking sites provide a unique 
challenge, because they are neither purely e-mail-centered (like 
Hotmail), nor purely community-based (like electronic bulletin 
boards).79 
It appears that courts have reached a consensus that social 
networking sites, despite their variation in function, are ECS 
providers to the extent they provide private messaging and the 
messages have not been opened. Outlining the precedent it 
followed, one court remarked that, since an ECS provider is 
“any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send 
or receive wire or electronic communications,” and “all three 
[social networking] sites [(Facebook, MySpace, and Media 
Temple)] provide private messaging or email services, the court 
is compelled to . . . [hold] that such services constitute ECS.”80 
Once the private e-mails have been opened by the recipient, the 
social networking site operator is functioning as a “remote 
computer service” provider, storing the messages for the 
recipient.81 Whether the social networking sites are operating 
as an ECS or RCS provider as to any particular message at any 
particular time, they cannot disclose an employee‟s 
communications without permission of the employee.82 
The one court that has decided the precise issue of whether 
personal information and communications on social networking 
sites are protected by the SCA said that social networking sites 
 
78. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., No. CV-09-09509 MMM 
(JEMx), 2010 WL 2293238, at *13-15 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2010) (discussing 
cases with divergent holdings). 
79. See id. at *9; see also id. at *14 (“[T]he difficulty in interpreting the 
statute is „compounded by the fact that the [SCA] was written prior to the 
advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web. As a result, the existing 
statutory framework is ill-suited to address modern forms of communication 
like [Facebook and MySpace]. Courts have struggled to analyze problems 
involving modern technology within the confines of this statutory framework, 
often with unsatisfying results.‟” (quoting Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 
302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002))); Blank, supra note 21, at 488 (“The 
existence of social networking Web sites challenges the current mechanisms 
of e-discovery, and it remains unknown whether litigants may require an 
employer to provide information about employees‟ social networking 
activity.”). 
80. Crispin, 2010 WL 2293238, at *9 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
81. Id. at *13. 
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
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are alternatively either an ECS or RCS with regard to posts on 
message or bulletin boards or a user‟s Facebook “wall,”83 and 
regardless of a site‟s classification, it cannot disclose such posts 
without permission of the employee.84 However, if there are no 
privacy settings protecting the employee‟s social networking 
profile, such that her message board or “wall” is available to 
the public,85 the SCA would not apply.86 
Social networking site operators can disclose employee 
information or communications to defense counsel with 
permission of the employee.87 The SCA allows site operators to 
“divulge a record or other information pertaining to a 
subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the 
contents of communications covered by subsection (a)(1) or 
(a)(2))” with the customer‟s consent.88 So, for example, if an 
employee has deleted her account but authorizes a social 
 
83. See Crispin, 2010 WL 2293238, at *14-16. 
84. Id. 
85. Cf. Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 438 n.3 (Md. 
2009) (“Social networking sites and blogs are sophisticated tools of 
communication where the user voluntarily provides information that the user 
wants to share with others. Web sites, such as Facebook and MySpace, allow 
the user to tightly control the dissemination of that information. The user can 
choose what information to provide or can choose not to provide information. 
The act of posting information on a social networking site, without the poster 
limiting access to that information, makes whatever is posted available to the 
world at large.”). 
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (“It shall not be unlawful under this 
chapter or chapter 121 of this title for any person—(i) to intercept or access 
an electronic communication made through an electronic communication 
system that is so configured so that such communication is readily accessible 
to the general public.”). 
87. See, e.g., Barnes v. Cus Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-0764, 2010 WL 
2196591, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2010) (“Facebook does point out that it is 
willing to provide information from its files with the consent of [the user]. . . . 
[T]here was some indication that [said user] would be willing to sign a 
consent for this material to be furnished to the Magistrate Judge for review. 
If that in fact could be accomplished, then future problems concerning 
potential access to this material could be avoided.”); Mackelprang v. Fid. 
Nat‟l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06CV00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 
119149, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) (“In response to the subpoena, 
MySpace.com produced certain „public‟ information regarding the two 
accounts, but refused to produce private email messages on either account in 
the absence of a search warrant or a letter of consent to production by the 
owner of the account.”). 
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c). 
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networking site operator to release her information and 
communications to defense counsel, the site operator can do so. 
Additionally, it might even be possible in the case of an 
employee‟s prosecution of a workers‟ compensation claim for 
the judge to compel the employee to sign a consent form for the 
release of her account information and communications from a 
site operator, if relevant to the employee‟s claim.89 It is more 
likely that a judge would not do so, however, and weigh the 
employee‟s failure to consent to the release of the information 
in his or her evaluation of the employee‟s claim. 
 
2.  Privacy 
 
While an employee could argue that she has a privacy 
interest in her social networking profile information precluding 
disclosure, that argument is likely to fail in workers‟ 
compensation courts.90 It is undisputed in the case law that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy when she 
has an account with a social networking site or Internet service 
provider: “[A] person has no expectation of privacy in Internet 
subscriber information. . . . [This is consistent with] settled 
federal law that a person has no reasonable expectation of 
 
89. See, e.g., Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1446 (Ct. 
App. 2006) (“Where a party to the communication is also a party to the 
litigation, it would seem within the power of a court to consent to disclosure 
on pain of discovery sanctions.”); see also Bruce Nye, More About Facebook: 
How to Get Facebook Records in the Litigation Arena, CAL BIZ LIT (Aug. 24, 
2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.calbizlit.com/cal_biz_lit/2009/08/more-about-
facebook-how-to-get-facebook-records-in-the-litigation-arena.html. 
90. See Blank, supra note 21, at 510 (“When employees place 
information on the Internet without taking measures to protect the 
information, the employee does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in such information because the Internet is a public medium. A person cannot 
maintain a subjective belief that information placed on the Internet will be 
kept private since such actions show the person wishes to waive their privacy 
interest. Most notably, one court has suggested that even when protectionist 
measures, such as password-protecting access to materials placed on the 
Internet, are taken, the materials are not considered private because they 
could be accessed by the public.” (citing United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. 
Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002))). Any right to privacy the employee has is 
not absolute. In the workers‟ compensation context, it is likely that an 
overriding objective is “facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection 
with legal proceedings.” See Kahn v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 752, 
765 (Ct. App. 1987). 
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privacy in information exposed to third parties, like a 
telephone company or bank.”91 An employee likewise does not 
have a privacy interest in what she posts to her profile on a 
social networking site.92 Even if the employee protects her 
information on a social networking site with privacy settings, 
she still does not have a privacy interest in what is posted or 
communicated to or through her account.93 
 
III.  Professional Responsibility Issues in Discovery of   
Employee Information from Social Networking Sites 
 
This Part explores issues of professional responsibility that 
arise for a plaintiff‟s attorney and defense counsel in 
connection with an employee maintaining and producing, and 
defense counsel discovering, information about an employee 
 
91. Courtright v. Madigan, No. 09-CV-208-JPG, 2009 WL 3713654, at *2 
(S.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2009) (“The logic of these cases extends to subscriber 
information revealed by Plaintiff to MySpace.com. In sum, because Plaintiff 
had no reasonable expectation that the fact or existence of his MySpace.com 
account would remain private, neither the request by the Attorney General‟s 
Office for that information nor the disclosure of that information by 
MySpace.com violated Plaintiff‟s Fourth Amendment rights.”); see also Doe v. 
Shurtleff, No. 1:08-CV-64-TC, 2009 WL 2601458, at *5 (D. Utah Aug. 20, 
2009) (“In Perrine, for example, when law enforcement obtained records from 
Yahoo! linking a screen name to an IP address registered to the defendant, 
the Tenth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated 
because the defendant had no expectation of privacy in information he had 
voluntarily transmitted to a third-party Internet provider.” (citing United 
States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008))). 
92. See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 863-64 
(Ct. App. 2009) (holding that an ode posted on MySpace.com was considered 
sufficiently public that the poster waived any privacy interest in the online 
rant). 
93. See Blank, supra note 21, at 511 (“Even if a user restricts access to 
their information through the site‟s privacy settings, most social networking 
sites warn users that they cannot control how recipients may distribute their 
information. The possibility of inadvertently publicizing „private‟ user content 
on social networking Web sites makes an objective expectation of privacy 
unreasonable.” (footnote omitted)); see also Nye, supra note 89 (“So, bottom 
line: social networking posts may not be private at all; if they are, the privacy 
right is not absolute, and the defense can overcome the privacy protection by 
demonstrating their relevance. . . . [O]nce that is done, the court has the 
authority to require the plaintiff to sign an authorization or release, and at 
that point, Facebook, MySpace or whomever will have to respond to a 
subpoena.”). 
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stored on a social networking site. 
 
A.  Professional Responsibilities of the Plaintiff’s Attorney 
 
Plaintiffs‟ attorneys should advise their clients of the risks 
of posting information and photographs, and communicating 
through, social networking sites.94 Employees should not post 
any information or photographs that they do not want the 
employer or insurance company‟s lawyer to know or see—such 
as descriptions or pictures of the employee engaging in physical 
activities95—and not provide anyone who they do not know 
access to their profiles.96 Additionally, counsel should advise 
their clients not to post days and times of activities, as that 
could give investigators additional opportunities to conduct 
surveillance.97 Of course, to the extent the workers‟ 
compensation claim is fraudulent and the lawyer knows so, the 
lawyer cannot represent the client in the prosecution of her 
claim.98 But the mere fact that an employee‟s information or 
 
94. See, e.g., Floridians with Workers’ Compensation and Personal Injury 
Cases Should Be Cautious When Posting on Social Networking Sites Like 
Facebook, JOHNSON & GILBERT, P.A., 
http://www.mylegalneeds.com/library/facebook-posts-could-damage-your-
florida-workers-comp-or-pi-case.cfm (last visited June 7, 2010) (“However, 
there are some precautions you can take to protect yourself, short of 
boycotting the Internet all together. First, be vigilant in reviewing the photos 
and posts on your social networking site. Remove anything that you would 
not want an insurance company lawyer to see that could help defend against 
your case. Next, [c]heck your privacy settings which enable you to block 
certain people from seeing you on a particular site (Facebook allows this). It 
is also helpful to search your name in the search field and see what comes up 
to make sure it is acceptable (it is advisable to do this on Google and YouTube 
as well). Finally never accept friend requests or respond to emails from 
people you do not know.”). 
95. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
96. See, e.g., Awsumb, supra note 4, at 25. 
97. See Ceniceros, supra note 31 (“It‟s common for claimants to load 
their social networking sites with dates, easing the way for investigators and 
their cameras to find them.”). 
98. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2010) (“A lawyer 
shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal 
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel 
or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, 
meaning or application of the law.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 
4.1(b) (2010) (“In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not 
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photographs on a social networking site contradict the 
plaintiff‟s claim does not mean an employee‟s claim is 
fraudulent, because often interpretation of what a person posts 
on a social networking site depends on its context.99 A 
plaintiff‟s attorney also needs to keep in mind that a lawyer 
“generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing 
counsel of relevant facts.”100 However, the employee‟s lawyer 
might have an obligation to provide relevant information or 
photographs to a defense attorney in response to an 
interrogatory, document request, or other form of discovery 
demand, if the plaintiff can still access what the defense 
attorney seeks.101 
However, plaintiff‟s counsel cannot advise her client to 
delete information or photographs stored on a social 
networking site to the extent that what is stored on the site is 
potentially relevant to the employee‟s claim. According to 
Model Rule 3.4(a), “A lawyer shall not [„counsel or assist 
another person to‟] unlawfully obstruct another party‟s access 
to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document 
 
knowingly: . . . (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a 
client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.”). As one plaintiff‟s 
attorney commented in response to learning of a non-client plaintiff whose 
personal injury case was destroyed by information defense counsel learned of 
on Facebook, “The plaintiff was dishonest, and as a personal injury attorney I 
don‟t want anything to do with representing dishonest people. In fact, I tell 
my clients, I can always deal with the truth but a single lie can kill an 
otherwise good case.” When Facebook Isn’t a ‘Friend’ to Your Personal Injury 
Case, N.Y. INJ. L. BLOG (July 1, 2009, 12:34 PM), 
http://www.zifflaw.com/NYInjuryLawBlog/personal-injury-victims-cautious-
facebook-privacy; see also Roberto Ceniceros, Facebook Job Boast Leads to 
Workers Comp Fraud Charges, BUS. INS. (Sept. 14, 2010, 12:29 PM), 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20100914/NEWS/100919959. 
99. See Jodi Ginsberg, How Facebook Can Undermine Your Workers’ 
Compensation Case, GA. WORKERS COMPENSATION BLOG (July 11, 2009), 
http://www.georgiaworkerscompblog.com/2009/07/11/how-facebook-can-
undermine-your-workers-compensation-case/ (“Photos and updates can easily 
be taken out of context. Even your frequency of posting can be used as 
evidence that you have the capacity to perform clerical type of work. Posts on 
Facebook and other social media sites can be used against you to put you on 
the defensive and as leverage to reduce the value of your case.”). 
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2010). 
101. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
27
28 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:1 
or other material having potential evidentiary value.”102 The 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers counsels 
similarly: “A lawyer may not destroy or obstruct another 
party‟s access to documentary or other evidence when doing so 
would violate a court order or other legal requirements, or 
counsel or assist a client to do so.”103 Consequently, the 
employee‟s attorney should advise his or her client to proceed 
with caution in posting information to a social networking site, 
but should not advise the client to destroy information that 
already exists when the attorney assumes representation of the 
employee. 
 
B.  Professional Responsibilities of Defense Counsel 
 
There could be a lot of information relevant to an 
employee‟s workers‟ compensation case publicly available on 
Facebook or another social networking site,104 and defense 
counsel could find it because many potential plaintiffs in 
workers‟ compensation cases do not protect their profiles with 
increased privacy settings.105 There is nothing unethical about 
a defense attorney or an agent of the attorney accessing an 
employee‟s information and photographs stored on a social 
networking site that are not protected with privacy settings 
that block public access.106 The employee would have no 
 
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2010); id. cmt. 2 
(“Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a 
claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing 
party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or 
subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be 
frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed.”). 
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118(2) 
(2000). 
104. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
105. See John Browning, What Lawyers Need to Know About Social 
Networking Sites, DALL. B. ASS‟N NEWS (Feb. 1, 2009), 
http://www.dallasbar.org/about/news-archives.asp?ID=240 (“While both 
MySpace and Facebook feature various privacy settings and controls, 
enabling users to restrict certain information from public view, studies have 
shown that a surprisingly high percentage of users are unfamiliar with the 
protection afforded by these settings.”). 
106. See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862 (Ct. 
App. 2009) (“Here, Cynthia publicized her opinions about Coalinga by posting 
the Ode on MySpace.com, a hugely popular Internet site. Cynthia‟s 
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privacy interest in the information and photographs she has 
posted.107 Scouring the Internet for publicly available 
information on a social networking site is no different than the 
video surveillance in a public place that defense counsel may 
authorize in a workers‟ compensation case,108 and has actually 
replaced video surveillance as a popular form of 
investigation.109 It should be routine for defense counsel (or, at 
 
affirmative act made her article available to any person with a computer and 
thus opened it to the public eye. Under these circumstances, no reasonable 
person would have had an expectation of privacy regarding the published 
material.”); N.Y. St. Bar Ass‟n Comm. on Prof‟l Ethics, Op. 843, at 3 (2010) 
(“A lawyer who represents a client in a pending litigation, and who has access 
to the Facebook or MySpace network used by another party in litigation, may 
access and review the public social network pages of that party to search for 
potential impeachment material.”). 
107. See Moreno, 91 Cal. Rtpr. 3d at 862. 
108. See Mara E. Zazzali-Hogan & Jennifer Marino Thibodaux, Friend 
or Foe: Ethical Issues for Lawyers to Consider When ‘Friending’ Adverse 
Witnesses Online, 197 N.J. L.J. 726 (2009), available at 
http://www.gibbonslaw.com/files/1251901206.pdf (“A good rule of thumb for 
attorneys before poking around cyberspace is to consider whether an 
analogous noncyberspace situation would raise concerns. For example, 
viewing the public portion of a person‟s MySpace page or his post on a public 
message board is analogous to conducting surveillance on a subject. In both 
instances, there is no communication made with the person, nor is any 
misrepresentation made about the investigating individual‟s identity. The 
conduct would not invade a zone of privacy in either circumstance. Similarly, 
videotaping someone walking down the street, such as a plaintiff in a 
personal injury case, is akin to printing out information a person publicly 
posts online for all to see. The videotape or printout is a record of what that 
person has held out to the public.”). Also, the Professional Guidance 
Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association said that there is nothing 
unethical about a lawyer, or an agent of a lawyer, forthrightly asking a 
witness (who is not represented by an attorney) for access to her social 
networking profile. Phila. Bar Ass‟n Prof‟l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02, at 1 
(2009), available at 
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/We
bServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf (“The inquirer could 
test that by simply asking the witness forthrightly for access. That would not 
be deceptive and would of course be permissible.”). However, the lawyer could 
not ask an employee, represented by an attorney, for such access without 
going through the employee‟s attorney. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT 
R. 4.2 (2010) (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about 
the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.”). 
109. See Ceniceros, supra note 31 (“„It‟s the new video camera,‟ Pierre 
Khoury, a special investigator for Harleysville Group Inc., a Harleysville, 
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minimum, the insurance company) to search the Internet, at 
least in a popular search engine such as Yahoo! or Google, for 
information that is publicly available about an employee.110 
But what about information or photographs on a social 
networking site regarding an employee that are not publicly 
available because the employee has them protected with 
security settings?111 Can an attorney direct a third-party agent 
to “friend” the employee in hopes of gathering relevant 
evidence about the plaintiff?112 A Philadelphia Bar Association 
opinion addressed a similar question.113 The inquirer-attorney 
asked about the propriety of an agent “friending” an 
unrepresented non-party witness on Facebook and MySpace, 
whose testimony was adverse to the inquirer‟s client.114 The 
inquirer stated that the agent would state only truthful 
information—e.g., she would use her real name—but would not 
state her affiliation with the attorney.115 The inquirer wanted 
the agent to provide him with access to the witness‟s profiles on 
MySpace and Facebook because “the inquirer believe[d] that 
 
Pennsylvania-based insurer, says of the social networking sites. „Now we 
have a new kind of video camera, but we are not actually the ones filming. 
They are filming it for us.‟”). 
110. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010) (“A lawyer shall 
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation 
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
111. See Denise Howell & Ernie Svenson, Ins and Outs of Social 
Networking for Lawyers: How Tough Is It to Cast Your Profile Into Infinity?, 
L. PRAC. MAG., Jan. 2008, at 47, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/lpm/magazine/articles/v34/is1/pg47.shtml (“One 
important difference is the functionality of the sites‟ privacy controls. For 
those who take the time to examine and tweak their privacy settings, 
Facebook makes it possible to funnel certain information only to certain 
parties.”). 
112. “Dissembling” or “pretexting,” whatever the medium, is the practice 
of a lawyer or a lawyer‟s subordinate either pretending to be someone he or 
she is not, lying, or being deceitful about his or her intentions, all for the 
purpose of obtaining information from an adverse party or witness. See Eric 
Cooperstein, Facebook Ethics: It’s Not About Facebook, LAWYERIST.COM (June 
23, 2009), http://lawyerist.com/facebook-ethics-it%E2%80%99s-not-about-
facebook/. 
113. Op. 2009-02. In general, there is a lack of authority on these 
questions. See, e.g., Zazzali-Hogan & Thibodaux, supra note 108, at 726 
(noting that there is no New Jersey authority on point). 
114. Op. 2009-02, at 1. 
115. Id. 
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the pages maintained by the witness [contained] information 
relevant to the matter in which the witness was deposed, and 
could be used to impeach the witness‟s testimony should she 
testify at trial.”116 
First, the opinion states that, under Pennsylvania Rule of 
Professional Conduct 5.3,117 which is identical to Model Rule 
5.3,118 an attorney is responsible for the conduct of a non-
lawyer who “friends” the employee on the attorney‟s behalf. 
According to the opinion: 
 
But the inquirer plainly is procuring the conduct, 
and, if it were undertaken, would be ratifying it 
with full knowledge of its propriety or lack 
thereof, as evidenced by the fact that he wisely is 
seeking guidance from this Committee. 
Therefore, he is responsible for the conduct 
under the Rules even if he is not himself 
engaging in the actual conduct that may violate a 
rule.119 
 
116. Id. 
117. PA. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2010). Rule 5.3 of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in part: 
 
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or 
associated with a lawyer: 
. . . . 
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of [a nonlawyer 
over whom the lawyer has “direct supervisory authority”] 
that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if: the lawyer orders or, 
with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the 
conduct involved; . . . . 
 
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2010). 
119. Op. 2009-02, at 2. Another employee of the employer, such as the 
employee‟s supervisor, could already be “friends” with the plaintiff-employee, 
in which case the other employee could voluntarily, or be compelled to, share 
information with defense counsel that the plaintiff has posted on a social 
networking site. If the other employee is unrepresented, defense counsel 
cannot misrepresent that she is uninterested. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L 
CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2010) (“In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is 
not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer 
is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the 
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer‟s role in the matter, the 
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The bar association does not distinguish between the activities 
of an investigator or paralegal and the activities of a junior 
lawyer who the lawyer handling the case is supervising.120 
The lawyer is not responsible under Model Rule 5.3 for the 
actions of an investigator hired by the client who “friended” an 
employee as long as the investigator was not “employed, 
retained, or associated with the attorney.”121 Additionally, the 
communication between the investigator and the employee 
would be communication between parties, not between an 
attorney and an opposing party, and it would therefore not be 
prohibited by Model Rule 4.2.122 Consequently, defense counsel 
in a workers‟ compensation case is not acting unethically if an 
investigator hired by the insurance company “friends” the 
employee on a social networking site, as long as the lawyer 
does not encourage the investigator to do so and the 
investigator is not associated with her, and defense counsel 
could potentially use the information or photographs that the 
investigator uncovers in defending the employee‟s claim.123 It is 
not relevant to the lawyer‟s culpability whether the 
investigator used her real identity or not: what is critical is the 
lack of any relationship between the lawyer and the 
investigator. 
Second, the Philadelphia Bar Association opinion states 
that the attorney‟s proposed conduct violates Pennsylvania 
 
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.”). 
120. See Op. 2009-02; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 5.1(b) 
(2010) (“A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer 
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.”). 
121. State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof‟l & Judicial Ethics, 
Ethics Op. RI-153 (1993) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 5.3), 
available at 1993 WL 274201. In the scenarios described in the Michigan 
ethics opinion, insurance investigators used pretexts to film workers‟ 
compensation claimants acting inconsistently with their claimed injuries. 
Because the insurance company, and not defense counsel, hired the 
investigators, they “[were] agents of the company, not agents of the lawyers,” 
and the investigators “[were] not encompassed by the professional rules 
applicable to lawyers.” Id. at 2. 
122. See id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 4.2). 
123. See infra Part IV. 
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Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c),124 the same as Model Rule 
8.4(c).125 According to the opinion, it is deceptive for a non-
lawyer working on defense counsel‟s behalf to attempt to access 
an employee‟s profile on a social networking site while omitting 
a material fact—“that the third party who asks to be allowed 
access to the witness‟s pages is doing so only because he or she 
is intent on obtaining information and sharing it with a lawyer 
for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the witness.”126 
The fact that the witness might permit anyone to access her 
profile does not excuse deceit.127 The Professional Guidance 
Committee distinguishes the inquiry before it from the 
ordinary surveillance context—in the latter the videographer 
films, photographs, or observes the employee as she presents 
herself to the public and does not have to ask permission to 
gain access to a private area.128 The inquirer of the 
 
124. Rule 8.4 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct 
provides, in part: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (c) engage 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” PA. 
RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2010). 
125. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2010). 
126. Phila. Bar Ass‟n Prof‟l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02, at 3 (2009), 
available at 
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/We
bServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf (“The omission would 
purposefully conceal that fact from the witness for the purpose of inducing 
the witness to allow access, when she may not do so if she knew the third 
person was associated with the inquirer and the true purpose of the access 
was to obtain information for the purpose of impeaching her testimony.”). 
127. Id. (“The possibility or even the certainty that the witness would 
permit access to her pages to a person not associated with the inquirer who 
provided no more identifying information than would be provided by the third 
person associated with the lawyer does not change the Committee‟s 
conclusion. Even if, by allowing virtually all would-be „friends‟ onto her 
Facebook and MySpace pages, the witness is exposing herself to risks like 
that in this case, excusing the deceit on that basis would be improper. 
Deception is deception, regardless of the victim‟s wariness in her interactions 
on the internet and susceptibility to being deceived. The fact that access to 
the pages may readily be obtained by others who either are or are not 
deceiving the witness, and that the witness is perhaps insufficiently wary of 
deceit by unknown internet users, does not mean that deception at the 
direction of the inquirer is ethical.”). 
128. See id.; see also Zazzali-Hogan & Thibodaux, supra note 108, at 726 
(“The waters are muddied, however, when an attorney‟s concealment of the 
facts becomes a variable in the equation. The hypothetical we present is 
problematic because the paralegal attempting to „friend‟ the subject would 
not disclose his relationship with the attorney and his true intentions. The 
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Philadelphia Bar Association opinion proposed that his agent 
use a truthful identify;129 one issue that arises is whether the 
lawyer‟s conduct runs more unquestionably afoul of Rule 8.4(c) 
if the lawyer instructs an agent to use a false identity in trying 
to “friend” an employee. While there is no authority on this 
latter point, it certainly appears that such conduct is 
“deceitful.” 
Last, the opinion states that a non-lawyer who friends an 
adverse witness at the direction of an attorney violates 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct 4.1130 and 8.4(a)131 
 
paralegal‟s conduct is more invasive than simple surveillance but more 
importantly, it would occur under false pretenses. An analogy outside of the 
cyberspace context is if the paralegal knocked on the party‟s door; the party, 
without questioning the visitor‟s background or motives, allowed him to come 
inside; and, they engaged in a discussion that included information relevant 
to the lawsuit. While the party‟s voluntary act of allowing the paralegal to 
enter her home—like the party‟s voluntary acceptance of an online invitation 
to become „friends‟—may mitigate invasion of privacy concerns and call into 
question the party‟s discretion, the element of deception still exists. Until a 
New Jersey court or ethics committee makes a clear pronouncement, all 
attorneys should exercise caution before becoming „friendly‟ with adverse 
witnesses or parties on social networking sites.”); Clifford F. Shnier, Friend 
or Foe?: Social Networking and E-Discovery, INSIDE COUNS. (Feb. 16, 2010), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2010/February-2010/Pages/Friend-or-
Foe--Social-networking-and-EDiscovery.aspx?page=1 (“If a personal injury 
defense attorney hires an investigator to take videos of a plaintiff who claims 
he is incapacitated due to injury, and the investigator catches that plaintiff 
playing basketball, few courts would disallow that evidence and none would 
see any reason to discipline the defense attorney. However, if that same 
defense attorney asks his assistant to „friend‟ the plaintiff on Facebook, so as 
to obtain information that the plaintiff doesn‟t make available on his page to 
nonfriends, that crosses the ethical line.”). 
129. Op. 2009-02, at 1. 
130. PA. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2010) (“In the course of 
representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false 
statement of material fact or law to a third person . . . .”); see also MODEL 
RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2010); Browning, supra note 105 (“In 
instances where it is not readily available, beware the ethical pitfalls that lie 
in attempting to obtain access to such non-public material. Misrepresenting 
who you are in order to become a „friend‟ and gain access could be considered 
a violation of Rule 4.01 of the Professional Rules of Conduct.”). 
131. PA. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2010) (“It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another . . . .”); see MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 
8.4(a) (2010); see also In re Luther, 374 N.W.2d 720, 720 (1985) 
(reprimanding lawyer for violating DR-102(A)(4) and (6) in using false 
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as well.132 The opinion notes that states differ on whether 
lawyers and their agents can engage in deception in certain 
types of investigations.133 Even in states such as Oregon, that 
 
identity to gain information about debtors to initiate debt collection suits on 
behalf of his creditor-client). 
132. Op. 2009-02, at 4. 
133. See id. at 4-6. Compare IOWA RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 32:8.4 
cmt. 6 (2010) (“It is not professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients 
or others about or to supervise or participate in lawful covert activity in the 
investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights or in 
lawful intelligence-gathering activity, provided the lawyer‟s conduct is 
otherwise in compliance with these rules.”); N.Y. City Lawyers‟ Ass‟n Comm. 
on Prof‟l Ethics, Formal Op. 737 (2007), available at 
http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications519_0.pdf 
(distinguishing “dissemblance” from “dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation, 
and deceit” and allowing lawyers to use deceit in investigations of intellectual 
property and civil rights violations where no rights of third parties are 
involved, the risk of harm is imminent, no other means exists to obtain the 
necessary evidence, and the lawyer‟s and investigator‟s conduct do not 
otherwise violate the ethical rules, including the no-contact rule); OR. RULES 
OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2010) (“Notwithstanding paragraphs (a)(1), (3) 
and (4) and Rule 3.3(a)(1), it shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to advise clients or others about or to supervise lawful covert activity in the 
investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights, 
provided the lawyer‟s conduct is otherwise in compliance with these Rules of 
Professional Conduct. „Covert activity,‟ as used in this rule, means an effort to 
obtain information on unlawful activity through the use of 
misrepresentations or other subterfuge.”); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int‟l Collectors 
Soc‟y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 475 (D.N.J. 1998) (“However, RPC 8.4(c) does not 
apply to misrepresentations solely as to identity or purpose and solely for 
evidence-gathering purposes. . . . The prevailing understanding in the legal 
profession is that a public or private lawyer‟s use of an undercover 
investigator to detect ongoing violations of the law is not ethically proscribed, 
especially when it would be difficult to discover the violations by other 
means.”), with In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1176 (Colo. 2002) (“In this 
proceeding, we reaffirm that members of our profession must adhere to the 
highest moral and ethical standards. Those standards apply regardless of 
motive. Purposeful deception by an attorney licensed in our state is 
intolerable, even when it is undertaken as a part of attempting to secure the 
surrender of a murder suspect.”). Perhaps, in a jurisdiction such as Iowa or 
Oregon, it does not violate the Model Rules for a defense lawyer to supervise 
a third party who “friends” an employee to gain access to her social 
networking site if the lawyer believes that the employee is engaging in 
unlawful activity, such as prosecuting a fraudulent workers‟ compensation 
claim. For more on deception in undercover investigations under the 
professional responsibility rules, see generally Barry R. Temkin, Deception in 
Undercover Investigations: Conduct-Based v. Status-Based Ethical Analysis, 
32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 123 (2008); Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive 
Lawyering, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 577 (2005); and David B. Isbell & Lucantonio 
N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception by Undercover 
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have an exception for a lawyer to use deceit in investigations, 
the lawyer probably cannot use deceit when there is no 
violation of law, as is often the case with no-fault workers‟ 
compensation claims.134 In some states, a situation where this 
Philadelphia Bar Association opinion might be applicable in 
the workers‟ compensation context, in addition to the case of a 
fraudulent claim, is where a non-lawyer “friends” an employee 
who has a profile on a social networking site that advertises a 
business to the public.135 
 Whatever the ethics rules in a particular state, workers‟ 
compensation judges would have some discretion in whether 
they find the efforts of defense counsel and their agents to gain 
access to an employee‟s restricted social networking profile 
 
Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the Provisions 
Prohibiting Misrepresentation Under the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791 (1995). For a criticism of the 
narrowness of the exception for deceit in lawyer-supervised investigations in 
New York, see Gerald B. Lefcourt, Fighting Fire with Fire: Private Attorneys 
Using the Same Investigative Techniques as Government Attorneys: The 
Ethical and Legal Considerations for Attorneys Conducting Investigations, 36 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 397, 398-403 (2007). For a critique of lawyers hiring 
investigators to engage in deceit, see Michael Bonsignore, Note, Rules Exist 
for a Reason: A Commentary on Lawyers Hiring Investigators to Partake in 
Deceptive Tactics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 655 (2008). 
134. Or. State Bar Ass‟n, Ethics Op. 2005-173 (2005), available at 2005 
WL 5679600. In the case where the attorney suspects the plaintiff of 
breaching a duty, for example by filing a fraudulent claim, the lawyer can 
“advise” or “supervise” covert behavior but not directly participate in it. 
“[A]ny lawyer involvement in activity that includes the lawyer‟s direct 
misrepresentation or deception runs counter to the fundamental tenet of 
lawyer „honesty and personal integrity.‟” Id. (quoting In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 
977 (Or. 2000)). 
135. Cf. Baumann v. Joyner Silver & Electroplating, 47 W.C.D. 611, 
1992 MN Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 622, at *15 n.3 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. 
Sept. 1, 1992) (“Among other objections, the employee objected to the 
surveillance evidence based, apparently, on the claim the activities of 
investigators posing as potential customers for employee‟s self-employed 
business constituted improper direct communications between an attorney‟s 
agent and a represented opposing party. Although we do not here reach this 
contention, we note that the surveillance evidence to which employee objects 
is not in the record before us. Since, in our view, surveillance contact in which 
investigators seek to elicit only information which the employee would 
normally provide to the public in the course of his or her public activities is 
not proscribed conduct, we would in any event have needed to review the 
specifics of the contact during the investigation to determine the presence or 
absence of impropriety.”). 
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deceitful.136 Evidence can, however, be admissible in a workers‟ 
compensation case even if an attorney violates the rules of 
professional responsibility in obtaining it.137 But in certain 
cases, a court might impose sanctions and not admit into 
evidence what a lawyer obtains in violation of the Model 
Rules.138 
 
136. Cf., e.g., Rhoades v. Nabisco, Inc., 1985 WL 47399, at *3 (Minn. 
Work. Comp. Ct. App. May 14, 1985) (Gard, J., concurring) (“I would affirm 
the findings of the Compensation Judge because of the review standard 
presently applicable to the Workers‟ Compensation Court of Appeals. I feel it 
necessary to comment, however, upon the method used to investigate the case 
and the contacts made with the employee after the attorney-client 
relationship had been established and published. The majority has concluded 
that the employers and insurers are entitled to reasonable investigative and 
surveillance procedures and, undoubtedly, there are no limitations on the 
investigative and surveillance procedures contained in the Workers‟ 
Compensation Law. There is the allegation of the use of a hidden camera, a 
hidden microphone, a meeting established on pretense or pretext, and the 
allegation of fraud and deceit. This Court is certainly aware that the method 
of investigation and surveillance in workers‟ compensation cases has 
occasionally involved such pretext and actual misrepresentation as to the real 
intention of the party conducting the surveillance or investigation. It would 
seem that, in the absence of legislation dealing with such conduct, that there 
be considerable discretion in the trial judge with regard to the introduction of 
evidence gathered by such means. I do not believe that the analogy of 
entrapment is in any way applicable, since the law with regard to 
entrapment in a criminal proceeding would not only not here be applicable, 
but the conduct here does not constitute entrapment in any event.”); 
Clemente-Volpe v. Workmen‟s Compensation Appeal Bd., 624 A.2d 666, 672 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (refusing to disturb referee‟s finding that surveillance 
film was credible even though employee was “tricked by the investigators into 
performing tasks that required lifting and bending”); Isadore v. Workers‟ 
Compensation Appeal Bd., 465 A.2d 1096, 1099 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) 
(finding motion pictures admissible even though investigator tricked 
employee into performing acts inconsistent with alleged medical condition). 
137. See Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., 1996 WL 705445, at *4 (Minn. 
Work. Comp. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1996) (“This court may not construe or apply 
non-workers‟ compensation statutes or rules to determine whether there has 
been a violation of those statutes or rules. Furthermore, nothing in the 
statute or rule cited by the employee [Minnesota Rule of Professional 
Conduct 4.2] requires that evidence obtained in contravention of either the 
statute or the rule be excluded from admission in a civil proceeding.” 
(footnote omitted)); State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof‟l & Judicial 
Ethics, Ethics Op. RI-153 (1993), available at 1993 WL 274201 (“The 
admissibility of the surveillance results is a question of law, not ethics, and 
therefore will not be further considered.”). 
138. See, e.g., Midwest Motor Sports v. Arctic Sales, Inc., 347 F.3d 693, 
699-70 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding evidentiary sanctions—the exclusion from 
evidence of conversations obtained in violation of the Model Rules—against 
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The witness whose social networking profiles the lawyer 
inquired about accessing in the Philadelphia Bar Association 
opinion was not represented by counsel; if an employee is 
represented by counsel, then there is risk of the lawyer, or a 
third party acting under the supervision of the lawyer, 
violating Model Rule 4.2 in “friending” the employee. Model 
Rule 4.2 states, “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
communicate about the subject of the representation with a 
person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer 
in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other 
lawyer or is authorized do so by law or court order.”139 
Pursuant to Model Rule 5.3, the lawyer cannot direct a non-
lawyer to contact, or “friend,” the employee on the lawyer‟s 
behalf.140 This is no different than the physical surveillance 
context where an attorney who represents the employer and 
the insurance carrier potentially violates Model Rule 4.2 if an 
investigator, who is the attorney‟s agent, engages the employee 
in conversation during the course of the investigator‟s 
surveillance.141 
The same exceptions to the prohibitions in Rule 8.4 that 
apply in cases where deception is authorized in particular 
states would also likely apply here. But little in this area is 
certain, because as the technologies develop, so does the 
application of the ethics rules. What is certain, however, is that 
Rules 4.2 and 5.3, in addition to the Philadelphia Bar 
Association opinion, suggest, at minimum, that defense counsel 
 
attorney who, in violation of Model Rules 4.2 and 8.4(c), supervised an 
investigation where investigators deceitfully posed as customers of the 
plaintiff and secretly tape recorded conversations). 
139. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010). 
140. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
141. See State Bar of N.C., 2003 Formal Ethics Op. 4, available at 
http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp?page=332&keywords=6. Whether the 
information obtained through the prohibited contact is admissible is a 
separate question. See id. (“The Ethics Committee declines to opine on the 
admissibility of evidence. However, to discourage unauthorized 
communications by an agent of a lawyer and to protect the client-lawyer 
relationship, the lawyer may not proffer the evidence of the communication 
with the represented person, even if the lawyer made a reasonable effort to 
prevent the contact, unless the lawyer makes full disclosure of the source of 
the information to opposing counsel and to the court prior to the proffer of the 
evidence.”); see also infra Part IV. 
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should proceed with considerable caution before having an 
agent “friend” an employee.142 
 
IV.  Using Evidence Obtained from Social Networking 
Sites in Litigation 
 
Despite the prevalence of social networking, there are few 
published cases discussing the use of social networking 
evidence in litigation, and an absence of workers‟ compensation 
cases on the use of social networking evidence. This Part 
applies workers‟ compensation law, as well as pertinent state 
and federal court cases discussing the admissibility of social 
networking evidence and other forms of ESI, to offer guidance 
on when social networking evidence should be admissible and 
how judges should weigh it in workers‟ compensation litigation. 
 
A.  Admissibility of Evidence 
 
Workers‟ compensation judges have broad discretion in 
light of liberal rules of evidence, including rules as to hearsay 
and authentication. Despite that discretion, compensation 
judges may not disregard all traditional principles of evidence 
applied by state and federal courts in deciding whether social 
networking evidence is admissible. 
 
1. Maintaining Relevancy Despite Relaxed Admissibility  
Standards 
 
In state court, when ESI is offered as evidence, judges 
consider these types of questions: 
 
(1) is the ESI relevant as determined by 
[Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 401 (does it have any 
tendency to make some fact that is of 
consequence to the litigation more or less 
 
142. But cf. State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof‟l & Judicial 
Ethics, Ethics Op. RI-153 (1993), available at 1993 WL 274201 (advising that 
the lawyer does not violate Model Rule 4.2 when the client, and not the 
lawyer, hires and supervises the investigator). 
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probable than it otherwise would be); (2) if 
relevant under 401, is it authentic as required 
by Rule 901(a) (can the proponent show that the 
ESI is what it purports to be); (3) if the ESI is 
offered for its substantive truth, is it hearsay as 
defined by Rule 801, and if so, is it covered by an 
applicable exception (Rules 803, 804 and 807); (4) 
is the form of the ESI that is being offered as 
evidence an original or duplicate under the 
original writing rule, of [sic] if not, is there 
admissible secondary evidence to prove the 
content of the ESI (Rules 1001–1008); and (5) is 
the probative value of the ESI substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice 
or one of the other factors identified by Rule 403, 
such that it should be excluded despite its 
relevance.143 
 
As use of the Internet has become widespread, state courts are 
becoming more accustomed to answering these types of 
questions with regard to ESI, such as information from social 
networking sites, and more liberal in admitting ESI into 
evidence.144 
Workers‟ compensation judges generally have broad 
discretion145 and are not bound by state or federal rules of 
 
143. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Md. 2007); 
see also THOMAS BUCKLES, LAWS OF EVIDENCE 13 (2003). After enactment of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 
originally providing a framework for the Federal Rules, were amended to 
match the Federal Rules. Id. The majority of states currently have adopted 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence or use them as a model. Id.; see also Uniform 
Rules of Evidence Locator, CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST. (Mar. 5, 
2003), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/evidence.html. 
144. See Robert C. Rodriguez, Decisions Reflect Importance, Limitations 
of Evidence Obtained from Internet, LITIG. NEWS (Feb. 3, 2010), 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/020310-evidence-
admissibility-social-networking-saadi-dockery.html (“Courts are becoming 
more comfortable with Internet evidence and perhaps more liberal in 
allowing such information into evidence.”). 
145. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.411, subdiv. 1 (2008); Bey v. Oxford 
Props., Inc., 481 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Minn. 1992) (“In view of the well recognized 
principles that . . . the compensation judge is not bound by rules of evidence 
or by technical or formal rules of pleading or procedure . . . .”). However, 
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evidence, and therefore social networking evidence may be 
admitted even more liberally in workers‟ compensation courts 
than in state or federal court.146 Relaxed rules of evidence 
provide for informal and faster resolution of claims, consistent 
with workers‟ compensation‟s underlying goal of efficiency.147 
For example, one major obstacle to the admissibility of 
social networking evidence in state or federal court is the 
hearsay rule.148 Hearsay evidence that is inadmissible in state 
 
workers‟ compensation courts generally cannot adopt rules of evidence that 
are more restrictive than the state court rules of evidence. See, e.g., Fite v. 
Ammco Tools, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Neb. 1977) (“[T]he compensation 
court is empowered to admit evidence not admissible in the trial courts of this 
state. It does not, as we understand it, grant to the compensation court the 
right to establish rules of evidence which are more restrictive than the rules 
applicable to the trial courts of this state.”). 
146. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.411, subdiv. 1 (“[T]he compensation 
judge is bound neither by the common law or statutory rules of evidence nor 
by technical or formal rules of pleading or procedure.”); In re Wilson, 911 P.2d 
754, 758 (Idaho 1996) (“[I]n those areas where the Commission possesses 
particular expertise, it has the discretionary power to consider reliable, 
trustworthy evidence having probative value in reaching its decisions . . . 
even if such evidence would not be ordinarily admissible in a court of law.” 
(quoting Thom v. Callhan, 540 P.2d 1330, 1333 (Idaho 1975))); Roberts v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 949 P.2d 613, 621 (Kan. 1997) (“We are not unaware of the 
decisions holding that „[t]he rules of evidence . . . are not applicable in 
workers‟ compensations proceedings. . . . The admissibility of evidence is 
more liberal in compensation cases, not more restrictive.‟” (quoting Rodriguez 
v. Henkle Drilling & Supply Co., 828 P.2d 1335, 1341 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992)) 
(internal quotations omitted)); Adkins v. R & S Body Co., 58 S.W.3d 428, 430 
(Ky. 2001) (“[T]he principles that control the admissibility of evidence in a 
personal injury action . . . do not apply to workers‟ compensation 
proceedings.”). A few states, however, follow a contrary rule binding workers‟ 
compensation courts to the state rules of evidence. See, e.g., Paganelis v. 
Indus. Comm‟n, 548 N.E.2d 1033, 1038 (Ill. 1989) (“Except when the 
[Workers‟ Compensation] Act provides otherwise, the rules of evidence apply 
to Industrial Commission proceedings, including those conducted before the 
arbitrator.”). 
147. See Kenneth M. Berman, The Current State of Workers’ 
Compensation Law and Practice, 584 PLI/LIT 327, 330-31 (1998) (“The Acts 
are typically administered by a Workers Compensation Commission . . . that 
employ relaxed rules of evidence designed to provide for informal and rapid 
resolution of claims.”). 
148. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.411, subdiv. 1 (“Hearsay evidence which 
is reliable is admissible.”). Hearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court 
statement offered in court to prove the truth of the mattered asserted. See 
FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Even when judges are bound by hearsay rules, social 
networking evidence is often admissible due to the hearsay exception for an 
admission by a party opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). 
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or federal court is often admissible in workers‟ compensation 
courts.149 As the finder of fact, workers‟ compensation judges 
have discretion to determine if hearsay evidence should be 
excluded as “worthless rumor or gossip” or admitted as 
persuasive and reliable evidence.150 
Judges, however, may not entirely abandon the state court 
rules of evidence.151 Workers‟ compensation courts are the 
“gatekeepers” of what evidence to admit at trial,152 and, in 
doing so, they are bound by a standard of relevance.153 Though 
formulations vary, evidence is “relevant” if it “tends to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence.”154 
 
However, workers‟ compensation judges often admit hearsay evidence 
directly. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Conley, 620 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 2000) 
(admitting hearsay evidence when the information is within the knowledge of 
the employer); Chaisson v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co., 708 So. 2d 375, 382 (La. 
1998) (providing that the “general rule” in workers‟ compensation courts “is 
to allow hearsay evidence”); Lunde v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers‟ 
Compensation Div., 6 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Wyo. 2000) (stating that “a broad 
range of informal evidence, including hearsay, is admissible in workers‟ 
compensation” courts). 
149. See, e.g., Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., 1996 WL 705445, at *4-5 
(Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1996) (admitting parts of investigative 
reports that the employee alleged were hearsay). 
150. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Indus. Comm‟n, 402 P.2d 414, 417 (Ariz. 
1965) (“Much hearsay is worthless rumor or gossip, but there is also such a 
thing as „persuasive hearsay‟ and the fact-finding commission may be given 
credit for the ability to distinguish the one from the other.”). 
151. See, e.g., Hudson v. Horseshoe Club Operating Co., 916 P.2d 786, 
788-91 (Nev. 1996) (applying a relevancy standard for admissibility of 
evidence in a workers‟ compensation matter); City of Pittsburgh v. 
Workmen‟s Compensation Appeal Bd., 315 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1974) (“However, it has been held that section 422, and similar enactments 
applicable to administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, are not authority for 
denying parties in adversary proceedings fundamental rights embraced by 
some rules of evidence.”). 
152. Rodriguez, supra note 144 (“Lawyers should also keep in mind that 
courts are essentially the “gatekeepers” of what evidence comes in at trial . . . 
.”). 
153. See MINN. STAT. § 176.411, subdiv. 1 (2008) (providing that 
“findings of fact shall be based upon relevant and material evidence only”); 1 
PA. CODE § 35.161 (1989) (“relevant and material evidence shall be 
admissible”), available at 
http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/001/chapter35/chap35toc.html. 
154. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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State and federal courts apply the same relevancy 
standard to ESI as to any other form of evidence.155 For 
example, a Texas court admitted evidence from a mother‟s 
MySpace profile in a family law matter. In terminating the 
mother‟s parental rights, the Texas Court of Appeals 
admitted—and relied upon—two MySpace pictures that “were 
captioned, „At Ashley House Dranking it Up [sic],‟ and „Me 
Helping Ashley Stand Up, Were Both Drunk [sic],‟” as well as 
several photographs from a MySpace page showing the mother 
at a bar.156 
Similarly, workers‟ compensation courts should apply their 
liberal evidentiary rules to admit social networking evidence 
that is relevant, just as they do with traditional forms of 
surveillance evidence. “[T]he admission of [surveillance] 
evidence is within the discretion of the Workers‟ Compensation 
Court.”157 In Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., an employee 
injured his low back at work.158 Surveillance by the defense 
found that the employee was exaggerating his limp, and later 
surveillance, on video, showed the employee installing heating 
ducts.159 The employee was receiving temporary total disability 
benefits at this time and defense counsel filed a “notice of 
intent to discontinue temporary total disability benefits” based 
on the fact that the employee was working.160 Defense counsel 
offered reports at hearing prepared by an investigation firm 
the insurer hired to perform surveillance of the employee‟s 
activities.161 The employee objected on the basis of hearsay, 
arguing that the reports included statements made “by 
unidentified third parties” to investigators, and that the 
 
155. See, e.g., In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“We see 
no justification for constructing unique rules for admissibility of electronic 
communications such as instant messages; they are to be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis as any other document to determine whether or not there has 
been an adequate foundational showing of their relevance and authenticity.”). 
156. Mann v. Dep‟t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 01-08-01004-CV, 
2009 WL 2961396, at *10 (Tex. App. Sept. 17, 2009). 
157. Aken v. Neb. Methodist Hosp., 511 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Neb. 1994). 
158. Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., 1996 WL 705445, at *2 (Minn. 
Work. Comp. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1996). 
159. Id. at *2. 
160. Id. at *3. 
161. Id. at *4. 
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surveillance reports failed to identify which of several 
investigators prepared which parts of the reports.162 The 
defense argued that it had disclosed its intent to use the 
investigative reports months prior and had given plaintiff‟s 
counsel copies of the reports at that time.163 In addition, all but 
one of the investigators attended the hearing and the plaintiff 
was free to call them for cross-examination.164 
The compensation judge excluded portions of the 
investigative reports containing statements made by 
unidentified non-parties, but admitted the rest of the reports 
into evidence because the testimony of the supervising 
investigator provided their foundation.165 On appeal, the 
employee argued that the reports should be excluded because 
they were unreliable hearsay due to the investigators‟ 
misrepresentations during their investigation, making the 
investigators unreliable witnesses.166 The workers‟ 
compensation court of appeals found that the trial judge did 
not abuse his discretion in admitting the evidence.167 Similarly, 
workers‟ compensation judges have discretion to admit social 
networking evidence, in some cases even if acquired 
deceptively,168 as gathering evidence from a social networking 
site is a form of surveillance.169 To the extent such information 
is relevant to an employee‟s injuries or employment abilities, 
and has the proper foundation and authentication, the court 
should admit it into evidence. 
 
2.  Foundation and Authentication 
 
Whether evidence is offered in electronic or paper form, 
state and federal courts can admit the proffered evidence only 
if, in addition to being relevant, it is properly authenticated. 
Authentication “is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at *4-5. 
168. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra note 20. 
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finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims.”170 The proffering party has to establish that there is a 
reasonable basis for the court to draw this finding.171 As in 
Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., where the workers‟ 
compensation judge permitted surveillance evidence based on 
the testimony of one of the investigating officers who was 
available to the plaintiff for cross-examination,172 foundation 
for authentication of social networking evidence can be 
established by the investigator, attorney, or paralegal who 
found the information about the employee on the social 
networking site.173 
Even with workers‟ compensation‟s relaxed evidentiary 
rules, defense counsel has to establish that any information 
from an employee‟s social networking account was posted by 
the employee, because individuals can open social networking 
accounts under the names of other people.174 It is important for 
 
170. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). The party offering the evidence must lay a 
foundation for the judge to find the evidence authentic. See, e.g., Ruiz v. 
Virginia, No. 1915-07-4, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 566, at *12, *16 (Ct. App. Dec. 
23, 2008) (“Foundation is a more general term for what the proponent of 
evidence must establish before the evidence can be admitted. . . . [T]he 
proponent of a document having the characteristics of a business record 
establishes the proper evidentiary foundation for the introduction of the 
document into evidence by establishing that the document is authentic.”). 
Although workers‟ compensation judges are not bound by the federal or state 
rules of evidence, this standard for authentication provides a starting point. 
171. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 542, 544 
(D. Md. 2007) (“A party seeking to admit an exhibit need only make a prima 
facie showing that it is what he or she claims it to be. . . . The degree of 
foundation required to authenticate computer-based evidence depends on the 
quality and completeness of the data input, the complexity of the computer 
processing, the routineness of the computer operation, and the ability to test 
and verify results of the computer processing.”). 
172. Keiser, 1996 WL 705445, at *4. 
173. Unlike surveillance evidence that is obtained through informal 
discovery, social networking evidence may be obtained through formal 
discovery as well. See supra Part II.A.3. When social networking evidence is 
provided by the plaintiff in discovery, foundation and authentication are not 
in issue, as the plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity of the evidence. In 
cases where information from a plaintiff‟s social networking profile is 
obtained by informal discovery, however, defense counsel has to authenticate 
the evidence she seeks to introduce. 
174. Cf. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 542-43 (indicating that courts examine 
foundational requirements more carefully for electronically stored 
information than for hard-copy documents); St. Clair v. Johnny‟s Oyster & 
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the person who downloaded the information from the 
employee‟s social networking account to be available to testify 
as to when and how it was obtained and to confirm that the 
copy is accurate.175 Defense counsel also has to offer proof that 
the owner of the social networking account (the employee) 
actually wrote what counsel is introducing. The normal 
methods of proving authorship of social networking material 
include the admission of the author or testimony of a witness 
who observed the material‟s authorship.176 Another way to 
authenticate such material is to demonstrate the writing 
matches the plaintiff‟s distinctive style.177 If the plaintiff denies 
that the information on the social networking profile is hers 
despite a reasonable showing by defense counsel, the workers‟ 
compensation court can admit the evidence and evaluate the 
employee‟s credibility in deciding how much weight to assign to 
it. 
 
3.   The Notice Requirement 
 
Although there are no workers‟ compensation rules specific 
 
Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“[T]he Court holds no 
illusions that hackers can adulterate the content on any web-site from any 
location at any time.”); see also Keiser, 1996 WL 705445, at *4 (excluding 
surveillance evidence from unidentified third parties). One major difference 
between video surveillance and information gathered from social networking 
sites is that, with electronically stored evidence, there is an issue as to the 
source of the information, an issue raised in St. Clair. The Keiser court 
indicates that defense counsel‟s inability to identify a source of information is 
grounds for exclusion in workers‟ compensation cases. Keiser, 1996 WL 
705445, at *4-5. 
175. See Levine & Swatski-Lebson, supra note 14, at 3. 
176. See id. 
177. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 544 (“Although Rule 901(a) addresses 
the requirement to authenticate electronically generated or electronically 
stored evidence, it is silent regarding how to do so. Rule 901(b), however, 
provides examples of how authentication may be accomplished. It states: „(b) 
Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the 
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with 
the requirements of this rule: . . . (4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. 
Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive 
characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.‟”). Prior postings or 
other writings by the plaintiff indicating a particular writing pattern, style, 
or other identifiable characteristics may therefore be used to authenticate 
social networking evidence. 
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to notice or disclosure of social networking evidence obtained 
through informal discovery, rules regulating the disclosure of 
surveillance evidence should apply. In at least some states, in a 
workers‟ compensation case, parties are required to make 
pretrial disclosure of surveillance evidence to opposing parties, 
to prevent unfair surprise or prejudice, or else they risk 
preclusion from offering the evidence at the hearing or trial.178 
To the extent that states do not have specific rules governing 
notice or disclosure of surveillance evidence, ordinary rules of 
notice and disclosure under the workers‟ compensation laws 
should apply. 
In giving notice of social networking evidence, defense 
attorneys must provide copies to opposing counsel of what they 
intend to introduce at hearing or trial.179 However, workers‟ 
compensation judges likely have the discretion to permit a 
party to withhold disclosure of social networking and other 
surveillance evidence until after the time of an employee‟s 
deposition.180 
 
178. See, e.g., MINN. R. 1420.2200, subpt. 8(A) (2006) (“A party 
possessing relevant surveillance evidence must disclose the existence of said 
evidence to opposing parties . . . no later than 30 days prior to the hearing 
date.”); 34 PA. CODE § 131.61(a) (2002), amended by 32 PA. BULL. 6043 (Dec. 
7, 2002) (“Parties shall exchange all items and information, including medical 
documents, reports, records, employment records, wage information, 
affidavits, tapes, films and photographs, lists of witnesses, CD ROMs, 
diskettes and other digital recordings, to be used in or obtained for the 
purpose of prosecuting or defending a case, unless the foregoing are otherwise 
privileged or unavailable, whether or not intended to be used as evidence or 
exhibits.”); 34 PA. CODE § 131.68(a)(9) (2002), amended by 32 PA. BULL. 6043 
(“The deposition may be used to locate, authenticate and obtain copies of 
records which are material and relevant to the proceeding, including: . . . (9) 
Surveillance.”); Mietelski v. Banks, 854 A.2d 579, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) 
(finding that the trial court did not err in “excluding from the jury videotape 
surveillance evidence of Appellee, Ireneusz „Eric‟ Mietelski, due to unfair 
surprise and prejudice caused by late production of the tape”). Surveillance 
evidence in workers‟ compensation matters could include “any photographic, 
video, digital, motion picture, or other electronic recording or depiction of a 
party surreptitiously taken or obtained without the party‟s expressed 
permission or knowledge.” MINN. R. 1420.2200, subpt. 8(A). That definition 
encompasses information, communications, and photographs from a social 
networking site. 
179. See, e.g., MINN. R. 1420.2200, subpt. 8(A). 
180. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-61(1) (West 1990); Congleton v. 
Shellfish Culture, Inc., 807 So. 2d 492, 496 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (“The power 
to control when evidence is presented is well within the administrative law 
47
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B.  Credibility and Weight of the Evidence 
 
Although there is a liberal standard for the admissibility of 
evidence, including hearsay, in workers‟ compensation courts, 
evidence must be probative, trustworthy, and credible.181 As 
administrative agencies, these courts have the power to 
evaluate and weigh the credibility of evidence.182 Courts may 
accept all or part of the testimony of any witness.183 In 
determining credibility, workers‟ compensation judges often 
pay close attention to evidence impeaching or contradicting an 
employee‟s credibility,184 and this can include surveillance 
evidence. 
In Aken v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, the Supreme 
Court of Nebraska overturned the workers‟ compensation court 
of appeals and upheld the compensation judge who relied on 
the defense‟s video evidence to find that the plaintiff lacked 
credibility.185 The plaintiff in Aken worked as a nurse.186 She 
 
judge‟s statutory power.”). 
181. See Story v. Wyo. State Bd. of Med. Exam‟rs, 721 P.2d 1013, 1018 
(Wyo. 1986) (“Where hearsay evidence is by statute admissible in 
administrative proceedings, it is often held that it must be probative, 
trustworthy and credible; and, although it may not be the sole basis for 
establishing an essential fact and is insufficient to support an administrative 
decision, it may be considered as corroborative of facts otherwise 
established.”). 
182. See Kloepfer v. Lumbermen‟s Mut. Cas. Co., 916 P.2d 1310, 1312 
(Mont. 1996) (“The Workers‟ Compensation Court, as the finder of fact, is in 
the best position to assess witnesses‟ credibility and testimony.”); Wagaman 
v. Sioux Falls Constr., 576 N.W.2d 237, 242 (S.D. 1998) (“Department is 
allowed to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the 
witnesses.”). 
183. See Jordan v. Workmen‟s Compensation Appeal Bd., 704 A.2d 1063, 
1066 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (“[T]he factfinder in a workers‟ compensation 
proceeding may accept the testimony of any witness in whole or in part.”). 
184. See McGee v. J.D. Lumber, 17 P.3d 272, 278 (Idaho 2000) 
(“Evidence impeaching a claimant‟s credibility need not be ignored . . . .”); 
Schneider v. S.D. Dep‟t of Transp., 628 N.W.2d 725, 729-30 (S.D. 2001) (“The 
Department, after hearing numerous inconsistent statements made by 
Schneider, found Schneider to be not credible. „Where there are two 
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder‟s choice between them 
cannot be clearly erroneous.‟” (internal citation omitted)). 
185. 511 N.W.2d 762, 768-69 (Neb. 1994). 
186. Id. at 765. 
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argued that she was unable to perform her job duties as a 
result of a work injury and called witnesses at her hearing to 
testify to that effect.187 Evidence presented by both the plaintiff 
and defendant at trial revealed conflicting diagnoses from 
doctors.188 At the time of rehearing, the defense offered a report 
by a private investigator that “described surreptitious visual 
and videotaped surveillance” and the court admitted a 
surveillance videotape of the employee.189 
The plaintiff testified that, even on a “„good‟” day, she 
“limped noticeably” and “a layman could see the limp.”190 The 
surveillance tape, however, showed the plaintiff doing activities 
such as walking, carrying a child, carrying boxes, and moving 
furniture with ease and without any noticeable limping.191 The 
court admitted the surveillance evidence and relied on it 
heavily in terminating the employee‟s workers‟ compensation 
benefits.192 The type of analysis and reasoning in Aken in which 
the court admitted video surveillance evidence and 
subsequently used it to weigh the plaintiff‟s credibility is likely 
applicable to social networking evidence showing or discussing 
an employee‟s participation in physical activities.193 If a 
workers‟ compensation judge finds an abundance of evidentiary 
inconsistencies, preventing a determination that the plaintiff‟s 
injury is compensable, the employee has failed to meet her 
burden of proof necessary to win the case.194 
 
187. Id. at 766. 
188. Id. at 765-66. 
189. Id. at 766. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 768-69. 
193. There are no published workers‟ compensation cases directly 
discussing the credibility of social networking evidence. The Texas Court of 
Appeals, however, considered the credibility of evidence from MySpace.com. 
In re J.W., No. 10-09-00127-CV, 2009 WL 5155784, at *4 (Tex. App. Dec. 30, 
2009) (“[T]he trial judge said that he would „consider the credibility of the 
source‟—MySpace.”). 
194. See Aken, 511 N.W.2d at 766 (“The evidence presents a question of 
credibility. The Court received Exhibits 1-23 which included two videotapes 
showing plaintiff walking briskly and carrying boxes. This evidence is wholly 
inconsistent with plaintiff‟s assertions that she must walk on the sides of her 
feet to avoid pain and must avoid all carrying of groceries and that her pain 
has completely incapacitated her.” (quoting the compensation court panel)); 
see also In re Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971-72 (Wyo. 1996) (“Inconsistencies in 
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 A final evidentiary issue present in workers‟ compensation 
cases is for the compensation judge to balance the probative 
value of the evidence against the potential for unfair 
prejudice.195 There is, again, an absence of workers‟ 
compensation cases addressing this particular issue with 
regard to social networking evidence, but two federal court 
cases are instructive. In United States v. Drummond,196 a 
federal criminal case, the court discussed the admissibility of 
pictures from a MySpace account, weighing the probative value 
versus the danger of unfair prejudice.197 The court found the 
photographs provide probative value as to whether the 
defendant committed the crime at issue.198 The court went on 
to discuss the possibility of the evidence being prejudicial to the 
defendant.199 Ultimately, the court found that, depending on 
the testimony presented at trial, the probative value of the 
photographs may outweigh any danger of unfair prejudice.200 
The court deferred on making a ruling, finding that it must 
wait until the time of trial to rule based on whether the 
testimony regarding the alleged crime and the defendant‟s 
source of income is disputed at trial.201 
 
the evidence that prevent the finder of fact from determining whether the 
injury is compensable mean that the claimant has failed to meet his burden 
of proof. A claimant cannot prevail if factors necessary to prove his claim are 
left to conjecture.”). 
195. This standard is based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 but is also 
a universal standard used by workers‟ compensation judges. See, e.g., Dixon 
Prop. Co. v. Shaw, 2 P.3d 330, 332 n.4 (Okla. 1999). 
196. No. 1:09-CR-00159, 2010 WL 1329059 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2010). 
197. Id. at *2. 
198. Id. The MySpace photographs from Drummond depicted the 
defendant holding wads of money and a gun. Id. at *1 (“The photos depict 
Defendant counting, showing-off, and throwing large wads of cash while 
wearing a hat and sunglasses. . . . Additionally, one photo depicts Defendant 
either pretending to point a gun at the camera or pointing a gun at the 
camera.”). 
199. Id. at *2. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. (“[I]f testimony presents evidence that Defendant had no known 
source of income and yet often had significant quantities of cash on-hand, but 
Defendant disputes having possessed large amounts cash, it is possible that 
the relevance of the photos could outweigh any unfair prejudice. . . . As the 
Government suggests, possession of a firearm may be relevant to a charge of 
drug trafficking because firearms are known to be „tools of the trade‟ of drug 
trafficking. . . . However, the Government has not stated that testimony in 
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An insurance law case addressing the admissibility of ESI 
provides a closer comparison to workers‟ compensation for 
evaluating the danger of unfair prejudice and its potential 
consequences for both plaintiff and defendant. In Lorraine v. 
Markel American Insurance Co., a boat insured by Markel 
American Insurance was damaged by lightening.202 Magistrate 
Judge Grimm raised and analyzed the issue of balancing the 
danger of unfair prejudice against the probative value of e-
mails, computer animations and simulations, and digital 
photographs although neither the plaintiff nor defendant 
directly raised this issue.203 In evaluating this final hurdle to 
admissibility, Magistrate Judge Grimm stated that it is 
generally better to admit evidence if there is any doubt about 
the danger of unfair prejudice.204 
Lorraine suggests that, in addressing the admissibility of 
ESI, courts will play particular attention to the danger of 
unfair prejudice outweighing the probative value of electronic 
evidence when “the evidence would contain offensive or highly 
derogatory language that may provoke an emotional 
response.”205 Relevant social networking evidence should be 
admissible in workers‟ compensation cases because it involves 
an employee‟s physical capabilities and is unlikely to contain 
offensive or derogatory language or depictions. Also, judges in 
workers‟ compensations courts can control for emotional 
persuasion in a way that judges sending cases to juries cannot, 
reducing the risk of prejudice. Yet, workers‟ compensation 
 
this case will support the assertion that Defendant or the members of his 
conspiracy used firearms in furtherance of their drug-trafficking endeavors. 
Therefore, it is unclear to the Court that, in this case, possession of a firearm 
is intrinsic to the drug trafficking or conspiracy charged.”). 
202. 241 F.R.D. 534, 534 (D. Md. 2007). 
203. Id. at 584. 
204. Id. (“Generally, „[i]f there is doubt about the existence of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading, undue delay, or waste of time, it is 
generally better practice to admit the evidence, taking necessary precautions 
of contemporaneous instructions to the jury followed by additional 
admonitions in the charge.‟” (quoting JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN‟S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.02(2)(c) (Joseph M. 
McLaughlin 2d ed. 1997))). Obviously, providing proper instructions to the 
jury is not applicable to workers‟ compensation matters where decisions are 
made by judges and not juries. 
205. Id. 
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attorneys do need to consider whether information from an 
employee‟s social networking profile would “unfairly prejudice 
the party against whom it is offered” or “unduly delay the trial 
of the case.”206 
Courts or legislators should not adopt rigid rules adopting 
or banning evidence from social networking sites in workers‟ 
compensation cases. Rather, workers‟ compensation judges 
should hear the evidence and decide whether to give it weight 
and, if so, how much. Judges are gatekeepers of social 
networking evidence, and they need to understand and 
evaluate this form of technology in particular cases. 
 
V.   Conclusion 
 
The lawyers, judges, insurance companies, and parties 
within workers‟ compensation systems will increasingly 
confront the discovery, privacy, professional responsibility, and 
evidentiary issues that arise at the crossroads of workers‟ 
compensation law and social networking. In the absence of case 
law and ethics opinions that discuss these exact issues, this 
Article starts with the rules that govern workers‟ compensation 
cases, and discusses how they might apply to lawyers 
gathering, producing, and introducing evidence from social 
networking sites. But this Article is only a starting point. As 
workers‟ compensation systems are built on efficiency, 
flexibility, and discretion, workers‟ compensation is an ideal 
area of law for lawyers and judges to experiment with how to 
address some of the unique challenges and opportunities that 
social networking poses in litigation. 
While there is a lack of legal authority on these issues, 
that should not cloud the reality that many employees are 
using social networking in their daily lives. One thing of which 
we are certain is that lawyers who practice in the workers‟ 
 
206. Id. (“Thus, when a lawyer analyzes the admissibility of electronic 
evidence, he or she should consider whether it would unfairly prejudice the 
party against whom it is offered, . . . unduly delay the trial of the case, or 
interject collateral matters into the case.”). The issue of undue delay plays 
heightened importance in balancing probative value versus the danger of 
unfair prejudice in workers‟ compensation cases because of workers‟ 
compensation‟s underlying emphasis on efficiency. 
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compensation field need to be able to navigate around social 
networking sites, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and MySpace, 
and know how they work. Social networking is no longer a new 
technology, and ignorance should not be an excuse to the 
applicability of evidence from social networking sites in 
litigation. 
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